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SANTRAUKA 
Magistro darbe tyrinėjami Europos Sąjungos, Rusijos ir Juntinių Amerikos Valstijų politinių santykių 
dinamika nuo 1990 iki 2016 metų. Tyrimo metu iškeliama prielaida, kad politiniai santykiai turi matomą 
poveikį šalių ekonominei padėčiai, kai tuo tarpu ekoniminiai veiksniai yra pasitelkiami tik kaip priemonė 
politiniams tikslams ir nedaro ryškios įtakos politinių sprendimų priėmimui. Pirmojoje darbo dalyje 
aprašoma teorinė dalis, kurioje išsiaiškinama pagrindinių darbe vartojamų savokų terminologija. 
Apibrėžiamos esminės Tarptautinių Santykių teorinės pakraipos, kuriomis remiamasi viso tyrimo metu. 
Sumodeliuojama Tarptautinių Santykių schema, kuri padeda geriau suprasti sudedamąsias dalis. Iš išskirtų 
teorijų pasirenkama esminė pakraipa, kuria remiantis paruošiamos likusios darbo dalys. Taip pat, kiekvienai 
iš tyrime pasirinktų šalių pritaikoma viena iš Tarptautiniai Politikos Ekonimikai būdingų teorijų. Antrojoje 
darbo dalyje nuodugniai nagrinėjami Europos Sąjungos politiniai santykiai su Jungtinėmis Amerikos 
Valstijomis ir Rusija. Pradžioje aptariama metodinė dalis ir paaiškinamas pasirinktų idikatorių pasirinkimas 
naudojamų tolimesnėje baigiamojo projekto tyrimo dalyje. Plačiau analizuojama priimtų susitarimų 
paskirtis ir reikšmė Transatlantiniam bendradarbiavimui. Pabrėžiamas politinių santykių stabilumas, abejų 
pusių noras bendradarbiauti ir plėtoti tiek politinius, tiek ekonominius santykius. Išskiriamos svarbiausios 
sutartys, kurios leidžia toliau vystiti bendradarbiavimą. Atsižvelgiant į šiandieninus įvykius pasaulyje, šioje 
dalyje nemažas dėmesys skiriamas ganėtinai daug diskusijų keliančiai Transatlantinei prekybos ir 
investicijų partnerystės sutarčiai. Išskiriama politinio bendradarbiavimo teigiamas efektas ekoominiam 
stabilumui. Toliau šioje darbo dalyje išsamiai išanalizuoti ganėtinai problematiškus Europos Sąjungos ir 
Rusijos santykius. Skiriamas didelis dėmesys ryškiausioms problemoms, kurios labiausiai apsunkina 
politinį bei ekonominį bendradarbiavimą. Išskiriamas Rusijos Prezidento valdymo laikotarpis dėl ryškių 
pokyčių Rusijos požiūryje į Europos Sąjungą. Apibrėžiami pagrindiniai Putino politikai būdingi bruožai į 
kuriuos negalima nekreipti dėmesio. Sumodeliuojami esminiai nesutarimus skatinantys veiksniai. 
Ypatingas dėmesys skiriamas Europos Sąjungos ir Jungitnių Amerikos valstijų sankcijoms prieš Rusija. 
Išsamiai analizuojamos sankcijų pritaikymo priežastys, jų poveikis Rusijos ekonomikai. Taip pat šiame 
skyriuje identifikuojama ir analizuojama kaip veikia Europos Sąjunga kaip vienetas susidedantis iš 
 8 
 
skirtingų 28 šalių. Įvertinamos Rusijai palankios Europos Sąjungos silpnybės, kurios silpnina sankcijų 
poveikį. Trečiojoje darbo dalyje palyginami tyrimo rezultatai remiantis Tarptautinių Santykių teorijomis ir 
aptariami gauti rezultatai. Tyrimas padėjo išryškinti, kad nors ekonomika ir politika yra dvi labai glaudžiai 
susijusios sritys, tačiau politiniai sprendimai daro didelę įtaką ekonomikai. Ekonominės priežastys 
dažniausiai lieka tik kaip priemonės, kurios gali būti panaudojamos siekiant pasiekti tam tikrus politinius 
pokyčius šalyje ar jos politikų elgesyje. 
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SUMMARY 
The master‘s work describes dynamics of European Union political relations with the USA and Russia in 
1990-2016. The presumption is made that politic and economic relations are inseparable in today‘s world. 
It is also considered that political decisions made in states has a visible influence for state economy. The 
first section quite consistently describes the theoretical part of work. This section is used to define the 
concept of terminology. International Political Economy theories were identified and applied for each 
selected research object. The model of International Relations was created in this section for undeerstanding 
this complex academic approach. Classified theories helped to identify main approach of IR which was the 
base for further analysis. Each major theory of International Political Economy was integrated with selected 
states political models. The second part thoroughly describes the EU political relations with USA and 
Russia. Methodology is disscussed in this chapter. Initially, it discusses a methodology and selected 
explanatory indicators used in the selection of the final project in the longer part of the study. The analyzes 
of adopted resolutions and importance for transatlantic cooperations is deeply analuzed in this section. This 
chapter underlines the stability of political relations, both sides willingness to cooperate and to develop 
both political and economic relations. This section is also used for a distinction of important agreements 
that allow the further development of cooperation. In the light of today‘s events in the world, this chapter 
focus on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement. The positive effect on economic 
stability and political cooperation were identified. The rest part of this chapter is used to analyze in detail 
quite problematic relations between the Eu and Russia. Much attention is paid to the problems which have 
caused difficult political and economic cooperation. The huge attention is paid for the presidency of 
Vladimir Putin because of the notable changes in Russia‘s approach to the EU. Putin's policy defines the 
main characteristic features which can not be ignored. The model of essential difference promoters was 
created. Particular attention is given to the European Union and the United States sanctions against Russia. 
This chapter analuze in details the reasons for sanctions adaptation and their impact on the Russian ecinomy. 
Also in this section is identified and analyzed how the European Union works as a unit consisting of 28 
different countries. The biggest attention is paid for reasons weakening the impact of sanctions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU) came into existence in 1992, as the result of the adoption of the Treaty on 
European Union. But the seeds of the EU were sown many years earlier. The "birth" of the EU as the world 
knows it today occurred with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The 
modem history of European integration commences with the end of the Second World War in Europe, in 
May 1945. Modem European integration, leading to the EU, is generally agreed to have been born with the 
dramatic declaration of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of May 9, 1950.  The EU is set up with 
the aim of ending the frequent wars between neighbors, which culminated in the Second World War. Yet 
in 1951, six European nations, all historic enemies, entered into the ECSC. Under the ECSC, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) agreed to relinquish 
a measure of their national sovereignty to international institutions. The idea is for people, goods and 
services to move freely across borders.  The economic, political and social integration of Europe did not 
end with the ECSC. In less than a decade, after some dramatic disappointments, these same six countries 
entered into the European Economic Community (EEC). Through a series of Treaty amendments over the 
next 50 years, the EEC has become the modem EU. The EU, now with 27 Member States, represents one 
of the deepest forms of political, social and economic integration among sovereign nations in history. 
The EU has a close relations with the US since the creation of the EC in 1952. The United States was 
largely absent from efforts to rebuild Europe after the end of the First World War. The situation differed 
after the Second World War.  The United States, unlike after First World War, didn't opt for isolation and 
assumed its responsibility as the first world power by adopting a policy based on resolved intervention in 
European matters.  The American government was convinced that obstacles to free trade, spread after the 
1929 slump and risen to its maximum expression in the Nazi and Fascist autarchy, had been largely 
responsible of the international tensions that led to the Second World War. The implementation of a free 
trade policy became a basic condition for any country to receive the so desired American economic aid. 
Moreover, in that time the world witnessed the beginning of Cold War. The United States, applying 
the denominated Truman Doctrine to curb the expansion of communism and of the Soviet Union, launched 
the Marshall Plan to alleviate the difficulties of European countries. It was to foster economic development 
in a destroyed Europe with the political objective of impeding the extension of the communism. Part of the 
reason for US involvement in post-WWII reconstruction efforts was the developing "cold war" and the 
desire to stem Soviet power and influence in Western Europe. The US sought "an economically buoyant" 
Europe as a bulwark against communism. It had a vision of "an international economic system conducive 
to free trade and unfettered investment. Since that time the EU has a close relations with the US since the 
creation of the EC. Both sides decided to cooperate and to reach benefits in politics and economic fields. 
 11 
 
These close relations developed in a very diplomatic way over decades. The EU has growth over the years 
expanding this territory by welcoming new Member States (MS). The US, despite changes in the 
governments over the years, has always kept a favourable position toward the EU. Both sides feel for each 
other as an equal partners in the World. Since the beginning of the cooperation, both sides signed three 
agreements for shaping a better relations with a broader perspective for the future. The EU and the US 
created a common trade market, find a way to cooperate in the security sector and a way to build the bridges 
for open political dialogue. Watching the few past year’s situation, the EU and the US became even closer 
because of the similar position towards Russia behaviours in Crimeria.  
In December of 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen separate countries. Fifteen new 
neighbours’ countries were established for the EC members. Most of them became a MS of the EU over 
the years. Unfortunately, Russia stayed out of the horizon. The EU tried to use an opportunities to attract 
Russia to its MS list but Russia do not felt the same about the EU. The relations was not such diplomatic 
as the EU expected. Russia caused many problems which caused that the EU started to face a new prospect 
of IR. 
The past 26 years allows to properly analyse the two different types of the EU relations with the US 
and Russia. In one hand we have the example of democratic and cooperative IR which have growth over 
the years keeping the ties between the EU and the US more relevant. In the other hand we have a very 
different type of the relations with Russia. The states which has an exclusive state order and understanding 
comparing with the EU and the US. These differences had caused a lot of worries not only for the EU 
political dialogue with Russia but also it has a major effect for the World order because of many 
interventions to other countries and the political leader position that the only way to rule is firstly divide 
what is created.  
Many authors analysed a political dialogue of the EU and its dialogue with such countries as the US 
and Russia. Firstly, Nugent (2010) stressed out the origins of the EU political dialogue and the evolution 
of need to create an international relations with neighbours.  Pollack and Shaffer (2001) and Steffenson 
(2005) stressed out the importance of transatlantic relations. They analysed a deep cooperation history 
between the EU and explained such processes as creation of New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), policy 
shaping and economic liberalization process. Moreover, Ilgen (2016) emphasized that trade relations 
between two Atlantic sides has visible influence on trade relations. This author also described the possible 
future perspectives of transatlantic relations. Secondly, Haukkala (2010) theorized EU-Russia interactions 
with one another and analyzed negotiations issues. Finally, Leonard and Popescu (2007) represented the 
issues of decision making process in the EU when they concerns Russia. They indicated five different states 
groups in the EU which apply different political approaches towards Russia. Unfortunately, none of the 
above mentioned authors did not take attention for political dialogue affect to states economy. 
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Scientific originality of the final project. The political relations effect on state economy is relevant to 
study, not only because both these fields are not available to distinguish but also because it is one of the 
main problems why Russia experience the second crisis in the 21th century. Much attention is paid to the 
political decisions taken by politics and each of these decisions have the specific cost and effect on one or 
another states in many different ways.  
The problem of the final project: political relations dynamics effect on economic stability 
The aim of the final project: to identify political decisions dynamics influence on economic stability of 
the states 
The object of the final project: international political relations 
The subject of the final project: the EU political relations dynamics with Russia and the US in a context 
of economic changes in 1990-2016 
Tasks of the final project: 
1. To clarify the main theories of the International Relations in order to understand the selected states 
position regarding political relations 
2. To determine the EU political relations with the US and Russia in 1990-2016 
3. To extract political relations measures which have the most noticeable affect regarding EU relations 
with USA and Russia 
The methods of the final project: 
1. Descriptive method allowed to organize theoretical data concerning the International Relations 
theories used to identify the type of the political dialogue between the selected countries documents;  
2. Content analysis and comparative analysis was used to compare different types of political dialogue; 
3. Statistical data interpretation allowed to describe tendencies of states economic changes regarding 
the political relations dynamics 
Practical significance of the final project. Final project may help for everyone who is interested about 
the political decision and economic ties. While the analysis of political decisions for economic is also 
discussed in the final project, it might be helpful for those who are interested in the political means and 
their visible effect on countries health. The identification of political decisions level for economic affect 
will certainly be useful for the future scientific works regarding changes in a Global world and for those 
how are interested in a certain states economic situations over the selected period. 
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Structure of the final project. As regards, the final project contains four parts. The first part overviews 
main International Relation theories related to the political approaches of selected countries and identify 
what are dominating signs for each approach. . The second part of the project, analyzes the EU-US political 
relations by using various agreements information and statistical data. The third part of the final project, 
overviews the EU-Russia political dialogue dynamics during the years and analyzes what kind of affect 
these changes of political dialogues have had for Russia. Finally, discussion question and conclusions are 
provided with the main findings of the final project. 
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1. CLASSIFICATION OF MAIN THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 
 
International relations are a complex set which consists of several different spheres such as the 
economic, diplomacy, statecraft and even media. It is a key for ensuring a safe world. Without effective 
communication, any small misunderstandings can have critical consequences. As nations grow and change 
over time, IR are key for producing beneficial relationships. The study of international relations takes a 
wide range of theoretical approaches. Some emerge from within the discipline itself. Others have been 
imported from disciplines such as economics or sociology. Many theories of international relations are 
debated in many different terms, and few scholars believe only in one or another despite of fact which fits 
the most for them. In spite of this diversification, still exist several major schools of thought which are 
differentiated principally by the variables they emphasize—e.g. military power, material interests, or 
ideological beliefs. (Saner & Yiu, Hinkin & Holton & Klag 2005, Slaugter 2011) This chapter will represent 
in short the main evaluation of IR in academic approach and will mark the main differences between diverse 
theories. The last part of this chapter will focus mainly in the one IR theory which is the most common in 
today situation.  
 
1.1 Reflections of International Relations theories in political relations 
 
International Relations as theory can be drawn to E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’Crisis (1939) and 
Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations (1948) published books. In an academic approach, International 
Relations can be traced in the second half of the nineteenth century, when ‘economics’ emerged out of 
political economy as an allegedly scientific field of study. (Brown 2013; Ainley 2013) The International 
Relation can be interpreted in many different perspectives because of its interdisciplity. But this paper work 
will focus in IR as the study or relationships and interactions between countries, including the activities and 
policies of national governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
multinational corporations. It can be both a theoretical subject and a practical or even policy subject, and 
academic approaches to it can be either empirical or normative or both. A theory of international 
relations is a set of ideas that explains how the international system works. Unlike an ideology, a theory of 
international relations is backed up with concrete evidence.1 Often the IR is considered as a branch of 
political science, but it also a subject studied by historians and economists. Furthermore, it is also field of 
legal studies and an area of philosophy. There is many different science approach which can analyses the 
aspect of IR. From that broader perspective, IR clearly is an interdisciplinary inquiry and can be traced in 
any situation when two states interacted whit each other. (Burchil 2001, Cooper ) 
                                                          
1 Yadav Y. (2013). Political Thought on International Relations: An Analysis.  
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IR became an academic subject around the time of the First World War. Theoretical IR approaches 
are result of their time most important events. The scholars address those problems of international relations 
that are seen as the most important ones in their day. Also IR thinking is influenced by other academic 
subjects, such as philosophy, history, law, sociology and economics because of its interdisciplinary inquiry. 
It is important to notice, that IR approaches are time changing equivalents which are absolutely considerable 
with that time problems besides they are continuitly changing and forming new approaches because of 
differences in world order. Acording Jackson and Sorensen (2013) “the two world wars, the Cold War 
between East and West, the emergence of close economic cooperation between Western states and the 
persistent development gap between North and South are examples of real-world events and problems that 
shaped IR scholarship in the twentieth century.” And we can be certain that future events and episodes will 
provoke new IR thinking in the year to come. But first of all we shall focus on four major classical 
theoretical IR traditions. They are realism, liberalism, International Society and International Political 
Economy (IPE).  
Figure 1. Concept of International Relations (IR) 
 
Author works. 
Source: Jackson R. & Sorensen G. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. Oxford 
University Press. 
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Most theories of IR are based on the man idea that states always act in accordance with them national 
interest. State interests often include such indicators as self-preservation, military security, economic 
prosperity, and influence over other states. (Kenneth 2001).  Sometimes two or more states can have the 
similar or in ideal variation - same national interest. For example, two states might both want to foster peace 
and economic trade. The best example could be the relations between the EU and US when both sides seeks 
to foster the agreements for better cooperation in trade market or military power usage. And states with 
opposing national interests might try to resolve their differences through tense negotiation or even war. 
Regarding second scenario Russia’s relations with the EU and other states of the World is the best visible 
example. Hard power is often used as a mean to create a tense and in this way they try to resolve the 
situation in its own favour. Every of the above mentioned IR traditions describe different ideas of IR. 
The realist approach is based on the principle of the absolutisation of nation-state sovereignty and 
the foreground importance of national interests. According to realism, states work only to increase their 
own power relative to that of other states. As Jackson and Sorensen (2016) represents in their last work 
“Introduction to International Relations”, realism has several different variations from the classical realism 
of Hans Morgenthau, E. Carr, and R. Aron, the mature realism of Henry Kissinger, and to the neo-realism 
of K. Waltz, S. Walt, or R. Gilpin. (Jackson & Sorensen 2016)  Politicians have practiced realism as long as 
states have existed. Historically, realism is considered as the first theory according which states leaders 
ruled their countries. Most scholars and politicians during the Cold War viewed international relations 
through a realist lens.2 Realism was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War.3 It 
characterizes international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally 
pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. Realism dominated in the Cold War years 
because it provided “simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to 
cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent 
with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry”4. Realism is not a single theory dominating in IR. 
There always exist opposition. (Donnelly 2000, Jackson & Sørensen 2013) 
The main opponents of realists in IR are the liberalists. Liberalism developed in the 1970s as some 
scholars began arguing that realism was outdated and there must be some changes. Like the realists, liberals 
treat modern Western states as a universal exemplary model which guides their theoretical thought. 
(Donnelly 2000)  At the same time, liberals differ from the realists by a variety of principle positions. 
Liberals believe that “human nature, and thereafter, the nature of human society and its political expression 
                                                          
2 http://www.sparknotes.com/us-government-and-politics/political-science/international-politics/section2.rhtml  
3 Walt M.S. (1998). International relations: One world, many theories. 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/foreign_pol_walt.pdf  
4 Pfaltzgraff R. & McClelland C. (2013). International Relations: Political and Social Science. Encyclpedia Britannica. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/study-of-international-relations  
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in the form of the state, is subject to a qualitative change (assuming it to be for the better)”5. States could 
no longer rely on simple power politics to decide matters because of increasing globalization, the rise in 
communications technology, and the increase in international trade. Stephen M. Walt (1998) has indicated 
three strands in Liberalism. One strand argued that economic interdependence would discourage states from 
using force against each other because warfare would threaten each side's prosperity. A second strand, 
represents the spread of democracy as the key to world peace. This peace is based on the claim that 
democratic states were inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory for 
today’s world,  argued that international institutions could help dealing with selfish state behavior, mainly 
by encouraging states for the greater benefits by  cooperation. This cooperation, for example, can be such 
organizations as the International Energy Agency and the International Monetary Fund. (Stephen 1998) 
Transformations in the world have made economics and politics more relevant to one another than in 
the past and have forced the recognition that our theoretical understanding of their interactions has always 
been inadequate, oversimplified, and arbitral limited by disciplinary boundaries. Many economic factors 
have played an important role in international relations through history. Economic objectives, resources, 
and instruments of foreign policy have always been significant elements among political groups. We can 
find many examples of the role of economic factors in the affairs of nations in the history. In this sense, the 
political economy of international relations has always existed. Still economic and political factors have 
had a reciprocal influence on one another throughout history. Furthermore this interaction has been 
transformed in fundamental ways in the modern world. The spread of reciprocal influence has led to the 
nearly universal realization that the state can be used to effect economic outcomes and in particular to 
redistribute wealth un one‘s favor (Bonn, 1939, p. 33). That is the reason why IR theory of International 
Political Economy requires the additional attention. Besides, this direction of IR will be the main pole in 
which context will be formed the all further research in this project. (Marsh & Mackenstein 2005) 
1.2 Theories of International Political Economy field 
 
The importance of IPE showed up because of the inventible emerging of economic affairs. This 
happened because the economic well-being of peoples and the fate of nations have become intimately joined 
to the functioning and consequences of the market. Whereas powerful market forces in the form of trade, 
money, and foreign investment tend to jump national boundaries, to escape political control, and to integrate 
societies, the tendency of governments is to restrict, to channel, and to make economic activities serve the 
perceived interests of the state and of powerful groups within it. The logic of the market is to locate 
                                                          
5 Dugin A. (2016). A Review of the Basic Theories of International Relations. http://katehon.com/1295-a-review-of-the-basic-
theories-of-international-relations.html  
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economic activities where they are most productive and profitable. Thought the state seek to capture and 
control the process of economic growth and capital accumulation (Heilbroner 1985, Burchill 2001).  
In case to understand more deeply the mean of IPE we need to discuss three fundamental ideologies: 
Marxism, mercantilism and economic liberalism. Through an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses 
of these three ideologies it is possible to illuminate the study of the field of international political economy.  
Figure 2. Main theories of International Political Economy (IPE) 
 
Author works. 
Source: Jackson R. & Sorensen G. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Many scholars have produced a number of theories in tries to explain the relationship of economics 
and politics, but only these three ideologies stand out and have had a profound influence on scholarship and 
political affairs. In briefly discussed mercantilism, which developed from the practice of statesmen in the 
early modern period, assumes and advocates the primacy of politics over economics. It is essentially a 
doctrine of state-building and asserts that market should be subordinate to the pursuit of state interests. It 
argues that political factors should, determine economic relations. Liberalism was a reaction to 
mercantilism and has a little bit different opinion about the roles of politics. It assumes that politics and 
economics exist, at least ideally, in separate spheres. Liberalism theory argues that markets – in the interest 
of efficiency, growth, and consumer choice – should be free from political interference. The last one of the 
theories is marxism, which appeared in the mid-nineteenth century as a reaction against liberalism and 
classical economics, holds the position that economics drives politics. Political conflicts arise from struggle 
among cease with the elimination of the market and of the society of classes. (Little & Smith 2006) 
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The economic ideologies rise three propositions. The first is that the global or territorial distribution 
of economic activities, especially of industry and technology, is a central concern of modern politics and 
economists. That’s mean, according the ideas of Gilpin, that behind the technical discussions of trade, 
foreign investments, and monetary affairs are always conflicting national ambitions and the fundamental 
questions of „who is to produce what and where.“6 Although states can and do ignore the market as they 
seek to influence the location of economic activities, this entails economic costs. And third, due to these 
changes and the uneven growth of national economies, the inherent stability of the international market or 
capitalist system is highly problematic. It is the nature of the dynamics of this system that erodes the 
political foundations upon which it must ultimately rest and thereby raises the crucial question of finding a 
new political leadership to ensure the survival of a liberal international economic order. (Gilpin 1987) 
It is hard to imagine a world without International Political Economy. Main reason is because the 
mutual interaction of International Politics and International Economics is today widely appreciated and 
the subject of much theoretical research and applied policy analysis. The political decisions and actions of 
states clearly affect international trade situation and monetary flows, which in turn has a huge affect for the 
environment in which states make political choices and entrepreneurs make economic choices. These ties 
became even more coherent when some misunderstanding arises between the states. It seems impossible to 
consider important questions of International Politics or International Economics without taking them both 
into account. Unfortunately, many scholars and policy-makers often do not understand the collaboration 
between these two fields and still try to take only one of them into account. Economists often assume away 
state interests while political scientists sometimes look fail to look beyond the nation-state. In such case the 
dynamic interaction of state and market that characterizes political economy is missing. (Veset 2007) 
Michael Veseth explained in its article:  
 
“Two noteworthy Cold War era exceptions to this rule stand out: economist Charles 
P. Kindleberger's work on hegemony and political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz's attempt to 
integrate economics into politics in his path-breaking book Man, the State, and War. The 
mutual astigmatism that hid International Politics and International Economics from each 
other cleared in the 1970s as a number of dramatic international events made plain how 
tightly the two fields were intertwined. The oil embargoes of the 1970s and the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods monetary system are frequently cited as key events in IPE's 
development as a field of study.” (Veseth M. (2008). An excerpt form an article: What is 
International Political Economy?. p.1-2) 
 
                                                          
6 Gilpin R. (1987). The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.64 
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These events posed practical and theoretical problems that necessarily forced scholars and policy 
makers to consider economics and politcs ties together and in many situations put it together as a one entity. 
The events of free trade areas such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and customs 
unions like the EU provides a good example of the political economy of international trade. Regional trade 
agreements like NAFTA and the EU frequently use economic tools to achieve political goals. One of the 
political goals of European economic 6 integration, for example, was to strengthen the western Cold War 
alliance. One of the political goals of NAFTA was to stabilize and strengthen Mexico's democratic system. 
The economic benefits of regional free trade are intended to compensate states and their citizens for the 
loss of sovereignty and other political costs they may bear in forming a regional bloc. Thus, in theory, 
regional blocs create both political and economic benefits. At the same time, however, there are political 
and economic costs. Politically there is the problem of the democracy deficit. As more and more policy 
decisions are made at a level above that of the nation-state, the link between citizens and policy is 
necessarily weakened, which may weaken the legitimacy of government generally. Economically there is 
the problem that regional free trade is not always consistent with global free trade. International trade has 
always been at the center of IPE analysis and is likely to remain so in the future. This is not so much because 
of the economic and political importance of international trade itself as due to of the fact that trade is a 
mirror that reflects each era's most important state market tensions. In the Cold War, for example, 
international trade was simultaneously a structure of US hegemony and a tool of East-West strategy. In the 
1980s and 1990s trade, through regional economic integration, was a tool to consolidate regional interests. 
With the advent of globalization and the creative economy powered by advanced information technologies, 
trade in intellectual property rights has become a controversial IPE issue. International trade will remain a 
central focus of IPE even as the specific trade problems continue to evolve.  
As a resume, there must be concluded that IPE is an entity which requires a good collaboration 
between two very different fields which at the same time are related in more space than it was thought 
before.  IPE is tend to adapt with the changes over the year and its concept changes regarding the most 
important questions at that time politic and economic requirements. 
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2. DETERMINATION OF EU POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE US AND 
RUSSIA SINCE 1990 
 
The dramatically changes of the World situation after Cold War forced new type of the IR and political 
dialogue. The EU gained more respect and stronger position in the view of the US which allowed to become 
a considerable partner in international affaire and trade market. This type of relation started its evaluation 
and get fast acceleration. But these changes in the World not only strengthen the EU position but it also 
created new independent states such as Russia Federation which can be considered more troublemaker that 
partner for better cooperation. The continutly growing EU had have a hope to attract Russia to its union 
unfortunately the reality become contraversary different than it was expected. This chapter will determine 
the EU political relations with both selected states – the US and Russia. 
2.1 Methodology of chosen analysis 
 
The purpose of this study was to analyse theoretical information, main historical events and 
political/economical agreements illustrating them with data sources of selected measures and analysing 
data source information. These methods were selected because the understanding of political and economic 
relations requires not only the deep knowledge in theoretical information but only rise a need to be able 
evaluate political agreements effect for states. In this part of work, attention was concentrated to the EU 
political relations dynamic with the selected two states – the US and Russia.  
The determination of political relations started from analysis of historical events which were analysed 
by chronological order starting from 1990’s.  Data sources – charts with the annually result, were selected 
regarding the measurements of economic growth. First of all, the main economic indicators were identified 
for statistical analysis. For this purpose there was selected four different indicators which are the best 
measurements of economic growth: Gross Domestic Product, Import, Export and Monetary inflation 
indicators. The Gross Domestic Product measures the value of economic activity within a country. Strictly 
defined, GDP is the sum of the market values, or prices, of all final goods and services produced in an 
economy during a period of time. An export is a function of international trade whereby goods produced in 
one country are shipped to another country for future sale or trade. Exports are a crucial component of a 
country’s economy. Not only do exports facilitate international trade, they also stimulate domestic 
economic activity by creating employment, production and revenues. Monetary stability and economic 
stability can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Periods of protracted economic instability tend also to 
be periods of monetary instability, and vice-versa. Although the main objective of society is economic 
stability, in particular in the form of sustainable growth, policy-makers attach great importance to monetary 
stability, insofar as it is instrumental to achieving economic stability.  
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Finally, the observations of determination process were made by comparing the EU-US and the EU-
Russia political relations dynamics.  
2.2 Determination of EU political relations with the US and Russia Federation 
 
For a long time, the relationship between the US and the EU was concentrated with trade and 
economics. Unfortunately, it became clear that transatlantic security issues were necessary to involve. The 
EU member states were taking the first steps toward developing a more coordinated foreign policy. It 
appears that transatlantic consultations should be not only on economic issues but also on foreign policy 
matters. This led to the development of ad hoc meetings at various levels: from the US assistant secretary 
of state with European political directors to the US president with the president of the European 
Commission or the head of state of the country holding the rotating Council presidency. Mostly, these 
meetings were arranged simply at information sharing or to gain ore status and recognition in Washington.  
Official diplomatic relations between the US and the EU were established in 1953 when the US 
appointed its first observers to the EU.  But the requirement to cooperate was visibly necessary only with 
the end of the Cold War. The US-EU political relationship required mutual adjustment on both side of the 
Atlantic Ocean. Especially, when the US has noticed the growing EU political power in a world and started 
consider it as an equal player and partner for many spheres, e.g. trading, policy and etc. Transformation 
within Europe after collapse of the Berlin Wall led to a first steps for greater transatlantic cooperation.  
Transatlantic relations between the US and the countries of the EU have long been based on common values 
and interests which is the main idea of Librelasim theory of IR. It is important that both sides seek the 
common interests in terms of both security and economic interdependence.  
Figure 3. World biggest economies ranking by GDP (2016) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
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The EU and the United States are the largest economies and the largest trade investment partners on 
earth. The interdependence of these two economies has grown rapidly. This ever closer transatlantic 
economic relationship is the result of conscious policy decisions by the governments and business 
communities on both sides.  
Trade negotiations have become increasingly focused on „non-tariff barriers“ to trade since the late 
1970s. These negotiations includes differences in product and service regulation, lack of investor and 
intellectual property rights protection, closed government procurement markets and etc. These reasons have 
led to a new agreements and new negotiations rounds such as Doha Round which was meant to deepen 
further the reach of the global trading system. But these tries were meant to fail. The EU and US turned 
into different directions and started to create economically motivated bilateral FTA‘s with a number of 
Latin American and Asian countries. The growing bilateral agreements scale has pushed the EU and US to 
try deepen trade relation once more. Besides, there are two more possible factors which are often given as 
justification for the start of TTIP negotiations. One of them is the global financial and economic crisis that 
started in 2008. Second factor is continuitly growing of the China and other emerging economies vis-a-vis 
the EU and US. This fastened the trade negotiations not only because of competitors in global economic 
flows but also as contenders in global economic governance with polycemakers across the Atlantic 
expressing concerns that the EU and US are losing geopolitical and global economic relevance. The 
stagnation of the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks owes much to the ... of these emerging powers, 
which have broken the EU and US „duopoly“ of global trade governance (Grant 2007; Narlikar 2010; 
Defraigne 2005; Erixon 2013) 
The most important steps were made by the end of the Cold War in 1989. The fall of the Soviet Union 
shared the fear between some European leaders if the US would longer believe it was necessary to stay in 
relations with the Europe. They feared that Washington leaders would now pay greater attention to Latin 
America or Asia. Luckly, the situation was siurprisingly and everything happened in a contrary, some US 
leaders have feared that Europe would be tempted to develop a truly independent foreign policy. As we can 
see, the world order changes had caused the fears about the current relationship situation between the EU 
and US. In this perspective, both sides were encouraging to take some actions for ensuring a testimony of 
relations. The US do not take too long to act. Almost immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Secretary 
of State James Baker called for the US and the EU to strengthen their relationship through enhanced 
consultations. The continuing European economic integration process, as well as the regular enlargement 
of the number of participating countries, has no doubt exceeded the initial expectations of many, especially 
such strong country as in the US. The two blocs from both sides of Atlantic were soon trading with each 
other as partners. Since 1990‘s the character of relationship has changed substantially. Both Presidents 
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton were keen to provide some institutional structure to US relations with 
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Brussels. In December 1989, Secretary of State James Baker proposed 'that the United States and the 
European Community work together to achieve, whether in treaty or some other form, a significantly 
strengthened set of consultative and institutional links. Working from shared ideals and common values, 
we face a set of mutual challenges –in economics, foreign policy, the environment, science, and a host of 
other fields–. So it makes sense for us to seek to fashion our responses together as a matter of common 
cause.'7   
The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (TD) on EU-US Relations provided for a formal political 
dialogue between the two sides that was to be held on different levels and was to cover politics, economy, 
science and technology, and culture (European Commission 2006). After that two more transatlantic 
agreements signed to underpin this new transatlantic partnership and the increasingly liberalized the EU 
and the US economic relationship. In the first decade, since 1990 till 2000, three agreements in total were 
signed: The Transatlantic Declaration (1990), The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA, 1995) and the TEP 
(1998). Each of them have played an important role in creating and shaping a transatlantic framework for 
economic co-operation. Even more important that these agreements have introduced the formal transatlantic 
institutions to manage the relationship. Each of the agreements mark different aspects of cooperation.  
By the end of Cold War, the presidential administration of George H.W. Busch viewed the EU as 
great player in political and economic stabilization in the changing world order, and promoting the idea of 
new policy framework. The administration proposed “the Transatlantic Declaration to reaffirm the US and 
the EU solidarity following the fall of the Iron Curtain8 and the collapse of Soviet Union”9. This agreement 
focused largely on security issues than economic cooperation. But economic liberalization was one of the 
major goals named in description of agreement. This declaration was signed during the first regular meeting 
between high-level EU and US officials. The TD adopted in November 1990 during the Paris Summit 
meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The declaration laid the 
groundwork for a transformation of the transatlantic relationship to meet the changing demands of the post- 
Cold War global economy. The Declaration not even formally established a process of political level 
meetings design to build the enhanced partnership. It is also stressed the importance of common goals 
which are the main power source in keeping the EU-US relations in the best condition: 
 
                                                          
7 Cox M. & Stokes D. (2012). US Foreign Policy. New Yourk: Oxford University press, p. 230 
8 The term Iron Curtain refers to the boundary that divided Europe in the west and the Soviet Union and its Communist one-
party states in the east. The division began at the end of World War Two (WW2) in 1945 and lasted until the fall of the USSR 
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in 1989, a division that lasted nearly 45 years. Geographically, the borderline ran from 
arctic Russia in the north, through eastern Europe down to Bulgaria ending at Black Sea.   
9 Pollack M.A. (2003). The Political Economy of the Transatlantic Partnership. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University 
Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. p.5 
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Figure 4. Goals of the Transatlantic Declaration 
 
Author work. 
Source: https://useu.usmission.gov/1990transatlantic_declaration.html 
This agreement was the first one official document dedicated to further cooperation. Unfortunately, 
the situation in Yugoslavia began to have an effect for the stability of this declaration. Slightly more than 
six months after the signing of the TD it was clear that the summits meant in the agreement did not show 
any effective results. The same time major issues have showed, US-EU differences over trade policy 
became even more problematic question. It was especially seen in the endgame to the Uruguay Round10, 
which finally concluded in December 1993. The EU also asked a help to stabilize a situation in Balkans but 
president Bush administration refused to engage America. Indeed, the US explicitly asked Europe to take 
primary responsibility for the crisis in Bosnia (Soeren 2005). Baker, who defined the US national interest 
in classically narrow terms of secure borders and material survival, in 1991 said: 'We have no dogs in this 
fight'.11 Clinton, who came into office in January 1993, continued this non-engagement policy for another 
two years until September 1994, when the US finally intervened militarily to secure the Dayton 
agreement12. In the same year, the Clinton administration came into office and they were more disposed to 
regard the EU as a potential international partner, particularly on the transnational, or global, issues that 
were beginning to dominate the international agenda. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that 
the meetings authorized by the TD did not measure up to expectations. Both sides have had their own 
                                                          
10 The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) conducted within the framework of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), spanning from 1986 to 1994 and embracing 123 countries as "contracting 
parties". The Round led to the creation of the World Trade Organization, with GATT remaining as an integral part of the WTO 
agreements.  
11 Ross C. (2007). Independent Diplomat – Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite. Cornell University press,p.126 
12 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), 
Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
near Dayton, Ohio, United States, in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. These accords put an 
end to the 3 1⁄2-year-long Bosnian War, one of the armed conflicts in the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. 
http://www.osce.org/bih/126173  
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difficulties and there was little incentive on either side to make them more effective instruments toward 
attaining a US-EU partnership. 
After the Clinton administration came into force, the relations between the United States and Europe 
continued to be difficult and tense. Trade conflict shared apart all hard work done during the past 3 years 
and there was a fear that continuing trade conflicts would poison the political partnership that remained 
from the Cold War. The changes by leading powers in the country was not the only one factor aggravating 
the quality of transatlantic relations. For example,in 1989 the US imposed duties against the  EU agricultural 
products as a response to Brussels banned imports of hormone-treated beef. In other words, both sides tried 
to show their power in transatlantic relations and find put which of them is stronger. US-EU differences 
over agricultural trade policy delayed the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations by several years until an agreement was finally reached in December 1993 (Ahearn 2003). 
Any possible trade conflicts are always a huge object regarding the state stability. Increasing concerns about 
the US-EU relations caused some individuals on both sides of the Atlantic began to call for a major new 
transatlantic initiative. As it is seen through history, the best solutions and ideas are born in the most 
complicated situations when you are already ready to drop hands. By 1995, the Clinton administration 
feared that continuing trade conflicts were poisoning the overall US-EU relationship, and leaders on both 
sides of the Atlantic began to share the ideas about new initiative or other political gesture to underscore 
the staying power of the transatlantic alliance. In June 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
delivered a speech in Madrid titled 'Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century' in which he called 
for a major step forward in transatlantic relations: A broad-ranging 'transatlantic agenda for common 
economic and political action'.13  The need to make some reasonable changes was felt in other hands it 
would cause the end of political and economic cooperation between trade partners. New project was 
identified.  
Another chapter in the development of mutual ties was the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
signed in 1995. The NTA was driven by the concern of leaders on both sides that the new political situation 
is not promising anything good. The importance of the transatlantic relationship for both parties was clear 
and that made clear the expanding the scope of the relationship. In it, the parties undertook further steps 
towards political and economic partnership. Major changes were made. But the most important was the 
shifting from the “consultations” to the “common actions” format. That represented the new era of 
transatlantic relations which was meant to talks less and do more. The document identified the following 
key cooperation areas: promoting peace, stability, democracy and development around the world; 
responding to global challenges; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; 
                                                          
13 Secretary of State Warren Christopher speach on the Middle East Process (1996). Ireland 
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4233379/FID396/SPEECHES/WCSPCH96.PDF  
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and building “bridges across the Atlantic.” (Crespo, Hamilton, Roberts, Tindemans 1998).  Together with 
the NTA was launched its supporting Joint Action Plan which outlined three more substantive policy 
objectives: 
- Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world. In the Agenda, 
this focused primarily on Central and Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), as well as Russia and 
the newly independent states, although the Middle East and the more general issues of 
nonproliferation, human rights, and development were also noted. 
- Responding to global challenges.  This called cooperation to fight international crime, drug-
trafficking, and terrorism, as well as dealing with refugees, environmental protection, and infectious 
disease. 
- Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations. Specific actions 
in this area were to be directed at both the multilateral trading system and bilateral economic 
relations. (European Commision 2015) 
Unfortunately, this supporting document still left the difficulties on trade barriers. The dealing states 
decided once again try to deepen the relations with the one more agreement for the further NTA 
development. 
The 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) further developed NTA concepts. The TEP 
identified the following priorities of bilateral cooperation: eliminating barriers to trade in goods and 
services; ensuring mutual recognition of technical norms, standards and professional qualifications; and 
dealing with issues related to government procurement, intellectual property rights, biotechnology, 
environmental protection and standards of food production. The key area in the field of multilateral 
cooperation was further liberalization of global trade, with special emphasis on the implementation of WTO 
agreements.  
The Transatlantic relationship at the end of the XXth century is characterized “by a rapidly expanding 
agenda of common interests, deepening integration in the business world and among other organized 
nongovernmental organizations, a proliferation of inter-governmental contacts and negotiations, and a 
pattern of recurring public apprehensions and resentments.”14 In the beginning of the XXIth century both 
sides have founded that deeper cooperation between them is more needed then before. As a testimony of 
the previous agendas, the EU and US finally started the negotiations on the new agreement – The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.  Before the begining of TTIP negotiations the EU and the 
US discussed trade relations issues within the multilateral trading system under the auspices of the GATT, 
which morped into the WTO in 1995. In the begining the US assumed leadership in this system, promoting 
                                                          
14 http://www.tpnonline.org/WP/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Toward_Transatlantic_Partnership_Cooperation_Project.pdf 
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gradual liberalisation in the global economy, with the EU adoptong a more productive leadership position 
since the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). Ecause of sucessful multilateral trade negotiating rounds tarrifs 
have been lowered dramatically since the establishment of the GATT in 1947. Unfortunately, increased 
tarrifs have become an almost negligible barrier to imports. According the EC data, the average „most-
favoured-nation“ tariffs are 5.2 per cent for the EU and 3.5 per cent for the US, with both parties actually 
applying ever lover tariffs on each others imports of under 3 per cent average (European Commission 
2013a:17). 
In the last few years the EU-US relations are spinning around the one main goal – to sign a new 
agreement which will ensure the elimination of trade barriers and tariffs - The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. The need to promote a strong transatlantic relationship was seen since the early 
2000s. It was clear, that regulatory cooperation can play in building a strong transatlantic relationship. Both 
sides tried to find a way to revival of the US-EU relations and for both economies. The TTIP was considered 
as the best solution for all problems solvation. With this in mind, it could be argued that the trade agreement 
is a specific response which can be regarded as a symptom of deeper change (Cox, 1980). According to the 
EC website, the 'TTIP could create jobs and growth at home, give global trade a shot in the arm, and boost 
our influence outside Europe too'15. Despite of the great goal, this agreement caused very active discussions 
all around the World.  
In general, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is a bilateral trade agreement which is 
a potential reciprocal free trade agreement (FTA) that the United States and the EU are negotiating with 
each other. (Akhtar & Jones 2014) Unlike other trade deals, TTIP is different. It is because “of its scale and 
the extent to which it will interlock EU and US economies and impact upon a wide range of ‘regulations’, 
including the protection of social, environmental and labor standards, and the provision of health and 
public services”16. The core of TTIP is about the unnecessary costs of technical barriers to trade (TBTs), 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SSPS) barriers (in food and fee regulatory instruments), and other regulatory 
barriers in goods and services markets. Even more, this partnership aims are preventing new unduly costly 
barriers from arising.17 The idea about a large transatlantic market is not a new one ir can be tracked in 
1998 when the leaders from both sides of Atlantic set up the ‚Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue‘(TABD)18. 
Furthermore, the aim to create a better relation between these states was organized once again in 2011. 
Then they met to follow the work of the 2007 Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). The High-Level 
                                                          
15 European Commission (2016). In focus: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/  
16 Lambet J. (2015). What‘s wrong with TTIP: Voices opposing the EU-US trade agreement.   Calverts Co-operative  
http://www.jeanlambertmep.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/whats-wrong-with-ttip.pdf 
17 European Parliament (2015). TTIP: Technical Barriers to Trade, Including Standards. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/542213/IPOL_ATA(2015)542213_EN.pdf  
18 Trans-Atlantic Business Council. (2016) About TABD. http://www.transatlanticbusiness.org/tabd/about-tabd/  
 29 
 
Working Group on Employment and Growth was formed by the US and European leaders. This group have 
had to work on identifier policies and measures to implement in order to expand trade and investments.19 
That was a place where the original ideas about the TTIP was born. The final report of this group 
recommended ‚to launch negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investments agreement. The US and 
the EU member states have been negotiating this agreement since 2013 February when the joint declaration 
made by Barac Obama, Jose Manuel Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy relaunched the transatlantic 
partnership idea regarding the recommendations of HLWG.20 These negotiations were officially launched 
when all 28 EU members gave the European Commission the mandate to negotiate the TTIP. According to 
the first concluded agenda both sides decided to conclude the negotiations in two years. Unfortunately, 
many problematic questions was raised during the meetings, and they have had to update the timeline and 
aim to conclude the TTIP by the end of 2016. Twelve rounds of negotiations were organized until the 
beginning of the 2016.  
The final trade agreement has the main goal of eliminating trade barriers and tariffs in a large 
proportion of the economic sectors in order to make it easier to buy and sell goods and services between 
the United States and the member states of the EU21. It is estimated that the economic gains following this 
trade agreement will result in €119 billion in the EU’s member states and €95 billion in the United States a 
year22.  
 As the European Council has announced in 2013 ‘the agreement will be ambitious, comprehensive, 
well-balanced and fully consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and obligations’.23 This 
agreement is dedicated to develop trade and investments by tapping into unused potential of a true 
transatlantic market, generating new economic potential for employment and growth thanks to increased 
market access and greater regulatory compatibility, paving the way for global standards which could also 
be adopted by third countries. The figure below shows three main sectors which are listed under TTIP idea. 
(Council of the EU 2013) 
 
 
                                                          
19 European Commission. (2016). Transatlantic Economic Council: Cooperation on Innovation and Growth. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1263 
20 European Commission (2013). Final Report: High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf 
21 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ 
22 Questions and answers [Web Page]. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/questions-and-answers/. 
23 Council of the EU. (2013). Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnershio between the 
European Union and the United States of America. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/145014.pdf 
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Figure 5. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) conception 
 
Authors work 
Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 
 
All the aims of TTIP should be described in the 24 chapters which would be divided in to three 
thematically sections: market access, regulatory cooperation and rules. The section concerning market 
access focuses on achieving the EU's objective to gain easier access to the American market, in particular 
in trading goods, services (including financial services) and public procurement. The second section aims 
at cutting 'red tape and costs' and includes regulatory coherence, technical barriers to trade (TBT), food 
safety and animal and plant health, chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices, pesticides, 
information and communication technologies, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and vehicles. The last section on 
rules will lead to the adoption of new rules to make it easier and fairer to export, import and invest. It will 
contain rules on trade and sustainable development including labor rights, energy and raw materials, 
customs and trade facilitation, SMEs, investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), 
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competition, intellectual property and geographical indications, and government-government dispute 
settlement24. (Buonanno & Dudek; Fekbemayr, Heid & Lehwald 2013; Ghailani & Ponce Del Castillo) 
The goals of the TTIP are idealistic because both sides decided to reach as perfect agreement as it 
could be. It is natural, that the previous agenda is meant to be changed when the meetings took place because 
the dialogue allows to discus problematic questions and find the spheres which required an additional 
attention. After the first three negotiating rounds in 2013, the negotiators from the EU and US got a better 
understanding what kind is the respective approaches to the areas covered by the agreement. And the green 
light for real negotiations was given only in the fourth round. It took three more rounds to find out that there 
are the clear differences of view in how merge between the EU and the US should look. And there some 
main issues was found in these TTIP negotiated aims. It became clear that each of divided sections has 
more than one issue which are faced during the EU-US rounds. 
The first bubble represents a sector with the traditional tariffs and customs matters, government 
procurement, origin rules and services. The EU and US tariffs are already low and indeed many are equal 
to zero. But the agricultural sector is the exception. There was too many different regulations and rules for 
this sector. Comparing the requirements number in the EU and US – the EU has more than 40 requirements 
for agricultural products, when the US have only 5. So, even in this sector, which already has many zero 
tariffs, both sides meet regulatory issues. And they play a significant role.  
Taking into account “regulatory cooperation”, the leaders from both sides of Atlantic meet such issues 
as whether the costs of differences in regulation or its technical enforcement for bilateral trade can be 
substantially lowered. Broadly speaking, this is the hard core of TTIP. Happily, the EU-US has more than 
two decades of consultations and regulatory on regulatory regimes in its history. That allows to think that 
this hard core issue can be solved in the furute. But like always, some challenges rises from both sides. EU 
wants to be in control despite of fact that overall framework is a trade agreement. Although tariffs on food 
trade tend to be higher than other forms of trade between the US and EU, they are still relatively low, which 
points again to TTIP’s anticipated role in engaging non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). NTBs in relation to 
the EU and US food sectors are typically concerned with differences in Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
practices, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), and both hormonal and no hormonal growth 
promoters. Divergences in agricultural and food policy represent a major point of interest in trade 
negotiations between the two parties. These differences, the impact that a free trade could have on 
regulatory alignment, and the heightened level of passion of EU citizens about this topic specifically make 
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a discussion about GMOs as well as livestock sanitation and processing practices highly important when 
considering the future of the TTIP. (Felbermayr, Heid & Lehwald 2013; Jančic; Young) 
As the EU and US political relations dynamic can be called a stable and predictable to the near future, 
unfortunately there is an absolutely different situation regarding the dynamic of EU-Russia relations. In 
1988, the real history of the relations between the EU and Russia began. They signed a first treaty between 
the Soviet Union as a state and the European Communities. This treaty was called an Agreement on Trade, 
Commercial and Economic Cooperation. The objective of the Agreement is “to facilitate and promote the 
harmonious development and diversification of their trade and the development of various types of 
commercial and economic cooperation”25. The Agreement regulates trade in goods, except coal and steel, 
between the Parties. It includes a most favored-nation standard of treatment, provides for the elimination 
of quantitative restrictions, relief from duties and taxes. It stipulates that the goods shall be treated between 
the Parties at market-related prices. It provides for exchange of commercial and economic information and 
encouragement of trade promotion activities. It provides for the economic cooperation in order to strengthen 
and diversify economic links, contribute to development of standard of living, encourage environmentally 
sound policies.26 At the first time in the history, the EU started to build the bridge for better Europe together 
with Russia. 
Historical current flow in the direction which led to the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. That was 
the time of big changes in the Europe. In December of 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen 
separate countries. Fifteen new neighbors’ countries were established for the EU members. And Russia 
became a Former Federation of Russia. The Communities announced a Statement on the future status of 
Russia and other former Soviet Republics. The Statement acknowledged Russia as a successor of the Soviet 
Union and the EU decided to take into account each of the former Soviet Republics. In late 1991, EU had 
first realized that the original agreement which was signed with the USSR in 1989, had to be replaced with 
new agreements, due to the formation of number of successor states of varying size and structures. As a 
result, the Agreement on Trade, Commercial and Economic Cooperation have been concluded whit each 
of them. It is absolutely normal, that first of all this agreement touched the Russia because it was the biggest 
disintegrated country (Lazareva 2013, Badalov 2012).  
1991 is the mark for the underlying issue dimensions of the EU-Russia relationship. The framework 
of EU-Russia relations after 1991 has been dominated mostly by geostrategic changes.  Fifteen new 
countries came like rain from a clear sky. Some of them joined the EU and this gave the EU and Russia a 
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territorial interface by making them true neighbors. First enlargement which closer the EU and Russia 
happened in 1995 when EU enlarged to Finland and then, in 2004, the Baltic States joined the EU27. Since 
the first steps by near cooperation in 1991, the EU offered a warm welcome. We can even say, that the 
policy response of the EU to post-communist changes in Russia and new created countries could be 
developed in three overlapping stages. The first stage started with the period immediately following the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991. The EU was ready to help in all possible ways for Russia - give money, trade 
and advice. It also tried to transfer its own law system, policies making process, values and standards of 
democracy. Unfortunately, this burden of aid was not only because Russia needed a help to become a nicer 
place but also to enable it to gradually integrate with the EU. The main idea of EU’s original strategy 
towards Russia was that Russia wanted to be “like us” and that it needed our help. In other hand, that was 
only a vision created by the EU. But the EU insisted that bilateral relations should be based on EU norms 
and “shared values”. But there was one very important fact that Russia not wanted to become like the EU.  
In the period of second stage from 1994, the new instruments were developed. Such instruments as 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994), and the Common Strategy (1999), were used to 
improve the coordination of EU policy on Russia. These agreements also set down a new legal basis for the 
development of trade and investments links. The new partnership agreement with Russia also had have a 
very important role – “to establish regular political dialogue and to support Russia’s transition to market 
oriented economic system based on human right and democratic principles”28. This so called Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement state the determination to work together and strengthen the political and 
economic freedoms which constitute the very basis of partnership. The parties, EU and Russia, state that 
they belief in the importance of the rule of law, respect for human right, the establishment of the multiparty 
system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization leading to a market economy. 
(Hughes J. 2006) 
The first Common Strategy to be created was on Russia. This Strategy was dedicated to development 
of “ever-closer cooperation” and “strengthen the strategic partnership”. It was one more document which 
marked the initial actions for EU towards Russia. According this Common Strategy: the EU and Member 
states were to ensure the coordination, coherence and complementary of all aspects of their policy towards 
Russia.(Lazareva 2013,p.  The Common Strategy on Russia set a precedent for the “Christmas tree method” 
of policy-making which brought to a day light the EU minus. Rather than concentrate and keep working on 
main issues, Member States stared to ad new requirements to the document according to their own national 
interests. (Lazareva M., 2013) Finally, as J. Hughes named: the document outlined EU “visions”, “principal 
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objectives” and “specific initiatives” but distinguished two extremely important goals – maintaining a stable 
democracy in Russia, and “intensified cooperation” on common challenges. (Hughes 2006) 
The EU had hopes that it would be possible to change Russia from the base. The common values 
which are applied for the Member States must to also fit for Russia if she wants to be a part of so called 
Europe. But, the country as Russia, which society and ideology is strongly based on the culture, has to be 
considerable as an equal partner for the EU. Many years Russia was eager to follow their own values and 
the EU wanted to change them in enough short time and only by its own wishes trying to ignore Russia’s 
will. This is one of the reason why EU-Russia relations have experienced misunderstandings and 
frustrations. European still try to find the way how to make Russia look more ‘like us’. The EU made a step 
trying to convince Russians that they need for reform the subject of much lecturing. Misfortune, but this 
action was taken as arrogant and ignorant. (Shuette R., 2004) The relations between Russia and the EU 
have had a many different experience form the beginning. A lot of them were caused because of so different 
cultural backgrounds. Considering that culture is at the center of Russia’s self-understanding, the EU must 
take it into account. There is necessity to rethink initial blueprint towards culture aspect and take a step 
back, then analyses what makes us different and what unites us.  
The biggest changes happened after the Putin’s coming in the post of Russia President. First signs of 
Vladimir Putin showed up at 1999. At that time he was a prime minister of Russia Federation. He was 
involved in writing and presenting Russia’s official strategy to the EU in October of the same year. One 
year later, Putin’s become a president of Russia Federation. That was the beginning of so called “Putin’s 
era” or “Putinism” (Gudkov L., 2011). Putin’s came to power in Russia has significantly changed the 
political approach concerning the EU. Russia’s policy become oriented more to forging a keeper tier while 
retaining complete sovereignty. Putin never ties of linking Russian identity, culture and history to Europe, 
but the EU is Russia’s most important economic partner. Putin’s Russia does not seek any membership in 
the EU and all these years of trying to cooperate are marked by a refusal to allow the EU influence in 
Russia’s domestic development, including its economic policies or internal affairs, such as the Chechen or 
Ukraine conflicts (Lynch. D., 2004). 
So as we can see the complicated Russia’s interaction with the EU started from the very beginning of 
Putin when he was just a Prime minister of Russia. Therefore, all situations started to be even more 
complicated when he became a president. It allows us to understand that any political dialogue is always 
fulfilled by many hidden expectations from the EU side and even more suspicious from the Russia. Russia 
believes, that the EU is seeking to eliminate the independency of Russia and wants to stay as a dominant 
power in the region. However, Russia wants to help shape globalization, but not be one that is shaped by 
globalization. Russia keeps in it minds that they are special actor in the World and not a one from all. This 
is as the clustered black clouds over the heads which may to lash out at any time.  
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From 1999 Russia started the relations with the EU which was clearly written and presented in a 
document - “The Medium-term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russia Federation 
ant the EU 2000-2010”. The Strategy was written and presented to Brussels in October 1999 by then-Prime 
Minister Putin.29 Putin started to shape the relations between Russia and the EU by his own direction while 
he had not even seated the post of the president.  This document wrote by Putin presented a new strategy 
which was as an answer for The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Main point which the strategy 
reifies was that Russia’s autonomy is a great power distanced from the EU: 
 
“As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to 
determine and implement its foreign and domestic policies, its status and advantages of a 
Euro-Asian state and largest country of the CIS. The “development of partnership with the 
EU should contribute to consolidating Russia’s role as the leading power in shaping a new 
system of interstate political and ecnomi relations in the CIS area.” And thus, Russia would 
“oppose any attempts to hamper economic integration in the CIS [that may be made by the 
EU], including through ‘special relations’ with individual CIS member states to the 
detriment of Rusia’s interests.” (Vladimir Putin) 
 
It was said very clearly that Russia is refusing to allow Brussels to interfere in its sovereign affairs. 
But despite those strictly statements there was still left a place for tries to cooperate and create a good 
relation between two sides. Unfortunately, as we are going to discuss later, the statements said in 1999 has 
sharply shaped EU-Russia relations during past 17 years. And still it remains the centerpiece of its policy 
towards Europe. For a many years, Europe is trying to join all the European countries to the one Union and 
to set the same rules for all and find a way towards better cooperation in any field: economic, energetic, 
social and political. But all Member States should adopt the values and rules given by the Union and there 
is no other choice – take it or leave it. And there we see a country which is very important for creation of 
better Europe and it is – Russia. Notwithstanding Russia’s position is not a helpful for aspiration of the EU. 
Moscow continues to refuse to allow Brussels to have any possible influence over the direction of Russia’s 
reform policies and internal affair, including post-Soviet countries in which, according Russia, it still has 
an influence. Sadly, but the reality in relations with Russia keep a Greater Europe vison far away from it. 
Soon it became clear that the initial blueprint was not working by 2003. At that time Russia would 
have found it hard to follow EU rules. Russia stud up on her feet. That’s mean, that Russia no longer need 
helps from the West. After years of stabilization process consisted from chaos and humiliation, Russians 
reached stability.  Furthermore, at the Russia-EU summit in London in 2005 political agreement was 
reached to conclude a New (Basic) Agreement to replace the existing PCA. Negotiations on the New Basic 
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Agreement (NBA) were launched in July 2008. 12 rounds of negotiations were held. In anticipation of the 
resumption of the negotiations on the NBA after a lengthy pause initiated by the EU, Russia strives to place 
special emphasis on the need for new realities to be reflected in the future agreement, such as Russia’s 
accession to the WTO and the ongoing active process of Eurasian economic integration. Both Russia and 
the EU have undergone major political, economic and social changes since the PCA was signed. (Ferrari 
A., 2015) 
The year 2008 was expected to bring the positive momentum into the relations between Russia and 
the EU. However, not for the first time, the reality turned out to be different from expectations. And this 
time it was even worse than before. Russia did not show any signs of liberalizations which could have 
positively affected the bilateral dialogue. The new president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, limited himself 
with the pushing through legislation that extended presidential and parliamentary terms of office. It is 
noticeable that the situation between EU-Russia turned in a bad way. In that year Russia for the first time 
in its post-Soviet history used the military power outside the own territory in order to force change of 
borders (Moshes A., 2009). Georgia was that country which suffered Russia’s attack. The result of the 
Russian-Georgian conflict strengthened the impression that Russia had regained exceptional rights in the 
post-Soviet teritory. Despite of fact, that the EU considered these actions as unacceptable, the EU returned 
to the business with Russia. After this action, in January 2009, followed other unexpected action which was 
considered as threatening of Europe energy security.  Russia stopped the gas supply for Ukraine. This was 
not the first time when Russia lost the reputation as an Europe’s reliable energy supplier. (Ferrari A., 2015). 
Over the last seventeen years, experts, officials and politicians in Russia have been regularly referring 
to Greater Europe. The phrase has been used in various meanings. On several occasions since 2001 
Vladimir Putin has raised the concept of Greater Europe – a partly integrated common space comprising 
mainly Russia and the EU30. Putin clearly outlined Russia’s assets as a potential member of the new 
European community, and by doing so, identified the key areas of proposed integration as the economy, 
society and defense. The concrete outlines of the Greater Russia project's architecture gradually took shape 
between 2002 and 2011. They presented a Greater Europe that would consist of two integration blocs – the 
Western bloc of the EU, with Germany in the dominant role, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of the 
emerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in a hegemonic position. In advocating this concept, Vladimir 
Putin’s objectives included five-point plan for Greater Europe which Menkiszak (2013) described in many 
details: 
1. “A harmonized community of economies, from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, which in future could 
perhaps transform into a free trade area or even pursue some more advanced forms of economic integration. 
This community would be built in gradual steps that would include Russia’s membership in the WTO, 
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harmonization of legislation, customs procedures and technological standards, and elimination of 
bottlenecks in Pan-European transport networks; 
2. “A common industrial policy based on a synergy between the technological and resource potentials 
of the EU and Russia” - This policy would be implemented through joint projects to support small and 
medium enterprises and, even more importantly, “a fresh wave of industrialization” based on the 
establishment of strategic sectoral alliances in the shipbuilding, automobile, aviation, space, medical and 
pharmaceutical industries, nuclear energy and logistics; 
3. “A common energy complex in Europe”. The complex would comprise extended energy 
infrastructure, the Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines, and would be governed by new regulations, 
including a new energy treaty proposed by Russia, which would balance the interests of suppliers, buyers 
and final consumers of energy. Russian and European companies would share energy assets, and co-
operation would be developed at all stages (from exploration and extraction to delivery to end consumers). 
Co-operation would also extend to education and personnel training, creation of engineering centers, and 
implementation of energy efficiency and renewable energy projects; 
4. Co-operation in science and education. It would include, among other measures, the 
implementation of joint research projects, especially for applications in high technology industries, based 
on a shared financing effort, as well as exchanges of researchers and students, traineeships, etc.; 
5. Elimination of barriers impeding human and business contacts. This objective would be achieved 
by abolishing visas for travelers between the EU and Russia based on a clear plan and definite time 
schedule. (Menkiszak M., 2013) 
Also important in terms of the context of Putin's ideas was the agreement on the so-called road maps 
for the four common spaces between the EU and Russia, corresponding to the main concept of the Greater 
Europe. In 2003 Moscow summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed giving a political impetus to 
the formation of four common European spaces. On the 10th of May 2005 the EU and Russia signed four 
‘roadmap’ documents at summit level in Moscow, on four different spaces for cooperation: 
- the Common Economic Space,  
- the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice,  
- the Common Space of External Security and  
- the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. (Laquer W., 2015) 
These four common space shows that the EU and Russia over the years has come to encompass a 
great number of fields for cooperation. We can use the history of the four common spaces concept as an 
example of how EU-Russia relations are made. The work on this approaches in relations between these two 
parties represents a stock taking of what has been done and what should be done in the future work. The 
very structure of the concept also provides an appropriate guideline for showing how and where EU-Russia 
cooperation has developed since its beginnings. Let’s take a deeper look to the each of the Common Space 
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and what type of political dialogue they are forming in EU-Russia relations. (Bond 2014; DeBardeleben 
2007) 
The relations between the EU and Russia have had a lot of up’s and down’s. During the long history 
of cooperation there was reached a lot of agreements and signed many new partnership documents. Putin 
has also given his part for reaching a better cooperation and creating a strengthen Europe. Unfortunately, 
many of positive changes during Putin’s presidency stayed forgotten in today World. This is a result of 
Putin’s aggressive policy and the wishes to re-join post-Soviet territory and become a leader for all of them.  
From the very beginning of Putin’s leadership, its political dialogue was based on enough aggressive form. 
He didn’t try to hear what the EU is proposing to the Russia. Putin’s one and only seek was to keep Russia 
independent and strong in any price.  
Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere 
of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had 
to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. 
Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the 
face of Russian power. That became more visible when the EU enlarged its territory with more new Member 
States in 2004. Since then, as we can guess, the Russia felt unsaved and thought that now the Putin’s Russia 
has a more risk to lose its independence because of enlarged borders with the EU. Several years after the 
last EU enlargement Russia started the actions which was considered as inappropriate by the EU. 
The first aggressive actions and a will to be stronger than others from Russia side showed in 2005-
2006. Then, Russia tried to use the natural gas supply as a weapon to reach its political goals in the Europe. 
In a fierce political standoff that is threatening to affect domestic fuel bills across Europe. The conflict 
began when Russia claimed that Ukraine was not paying for gas and was diverting gas bound from Russia 
to the EU from pipelines that crossed the country.  Delivery from Siberian gas fields to Ukraine was cut off 
by reducing pressure in the pipeline network that also carries billions of cubic meters of gas chiefly to 
Germany, Italy and France.  The fallout was immediately felt in Germany and Hungary last night as gas 
suppliers warned of possible cutbacks. This actions were understood as real threat for the EU energy policy. 
(Ferrari A., 2015) 
Second moment when Russia lost a trust was in 2008. Georgia was once the jewel of its empire, and 
Russia has never psychologically accepted it as a sovereign state. Nostalgia for the Soviet empire has long 
been the leitmotif of Russia's ideology.  The Georgia President has led his country in a broadly democratic 
direction, curbed corruption and presided over rapid economic growth that has not relied, as Russia's mostly 
does, on high oil and gas prices. Unfortunately, the president of Russia was not happy about this conversion 
to the West side. The reaction of Putin was marked by the Russia armed invasion through Georgia in 2008. 
As it was announced by the highest Russian officials justified the operation by pointing to the need to 
protect Russian citizens living in South Ossetia from what Moscow’s leaders chose to call “genocide” by 
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the Georgian army in South Ossetia, purporting to follow the internationally accepted mode of behavior 
when governments must protect their citizens using military means, if necessary. But truly his Russo-
Georgian War was an armed conflict between Georgia, Russia, and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed 
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This war was as a tool to influence Georgia's domestic policy. 
Above all, it was used as a tool to prevent Georgia from further strengthening ties with the West.  Georgia 
had lost the war, but Russia was not able to exploit its military advantages in terms of numbers, geography, 
air-superiority and heavy equipment, hindered more by the disorganization of the Russian troops than by 
Georgian resistance. If Russia had been as quick in 2008 as it was in Crimea in 2014, Tbilisi would have 
fallen before Western diplomacy could react. The five-day war killed hundreds, left thousands of refugees 
in temporary shelters, and brought relations between Russia and West to their lowest point until that 
moment. By invading Georgia as Russia did, Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. The 
war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia's public return to great power status. This is not something that just 
happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power. This brutal and efficient move was a victory 
for Vladimir Putin, Russia's president-turned-prime-minister, not just over Georgia but also over the West, 
which has been trying to prize away countries on Russia's western borders and turn them democratic, 
market-oriented and friendly (Roudik P., 2008). Russia has shown what can happen to those that distance 
themselves from it, doing so will be harder in future. Russia started to revolt against the EU will to create 
the wider united region in the base of the “common values”. 
By the end of 2013, the World was shocked by the one more armed attack organized by the Russia 
Federation. And once again, this armed conflict was caused by the post-Soviet country will to join the EU. 
This time, the Ukraine get an access to the sights. Ukraine tried to fight not military, but the political fight 
while building of a sustainable democratic state. This fight started in the end of 2013 when a wave of 
demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine demanding closer European integration. This demonstration was 
called “Euromaidan” and was more than just demonstration as it was said by the journalist Lecia Bushak: 
“grown into something far bigger than just an angry response to the fallen-through EU deal.  It's now about 
ousting Yanukovych and his corrupt government; guiding Ukraine away from its 200-year-long, deeply 
intertwined and painful relationship with Russia; and standing up for basic human rights to protest, speak 
and think freely and to act peacefully without the threat of punishment”31. The president of Russia felt that 
a democratic Ukraine would be a denial of Putinism: it would demonstrate that there is no such thing as an 
Eastern Slavic specialness that endows with legitimacy a model of democracy specific to some Russian 
tradition (Ferrari 2015; Eberhardt & Menkiszak 2015).  
The unrest in Ukraine did not passed away without the huge attention from Russia. Finally, Moscow 
directly made an intervention in the war in Ukraine. Considering the political decisions made by president 
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of Russia, we can guess that Putin could not allow to loss of Russian influence in Ukraine. No matter how 
it would be strange, Russia do not accept with the accusation from the EU side that they actions were illegal 
and still make an actions in Ukraine. Now, Ukraine’s territory is divided into two separate parts. Crimea is 
splinted from the Ukraine and decided to support Russia side. Actions in the Ukraine started from 2006 
shows that Russia still believes in her own power. And the EU is the biggest enemy in a fight beyond post-
Soviet territories. The common-values idea is much more suitable for many countries then Russian 
oppression and this is the fact which is forcing Russia to worry about. Until Putin is in the president post 
there will be no changes towards the European side, because his policies and the manner of political 
dialogue could be called as a principle – “divide and conquer”. Previously, this section describes the events 
have only confirmed that Putin reach intimidate and thereby take power into his own hands. 
EU has failed to change Russia during the Putin era. Through all this time it is noticeable that Russia 
has had a big impact on the EU. On energy issues especially, when Russia is picking off individual EU 
member states and signing long-term deals which undermine the core principles of the EU‘s common 
strategy. That raises questions about the EU. Is it truly as common as we wish? Or it is only the preface 
dealing with Russia? Dealing with Russia is hard work for the EU. The main reason is that all members 
have a different experience dealing with Russia. And it causes an additional difficulties trying to take a 
suitable decisions towards Russia. The EU consists from 28 different states which have their goals, ideas 
and opinions in all the matters. This is the EU‘s biggest problem, however, is its inability to agree on 
analysis of the nature of the Russian government and to unite around a common strategy. Furthermore, 
Russia sees this weakness of the EU and use it in its favor.  
Regarding the different opinions about Russia, the European Commission have identified five 
different groups in the EU. Each of these groups has its own distinct policy approaches to Russia.  
Figure 6. Europea Union (EU) political dialogue approaches towards Russia
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Broadly speaking, we can say that the EU is split. Five different approaches towards Russia do not 
keep this Union so united. But first of all, there is a need to identify what is each group policy towards 
Russia, what kind of IR theories they apply and what is the effect for the relations with Russia. 
Hidden ‚Trojan Horse’ in the EU. “When the United States has concerns about European foreign 
policy,” says a European diplomat based in Brussels, “you can usually expect the UK or the Netherlands to 
speak up. Now Russia is doing exactly the same – getting EU member states to represent its positions and 
read from a Russian script.”32 It is very favorable for Russia because many decisions in the EU must be 
voted 100% in favor. And when there some members again, all the procedure must be looked and discussed 
once again. Mostly of the time it take a long. The most horrifying new is that Russia, in 2007, understood 
this EU weakness and even then they knew that they must have their own ‚Trojan horse ‘in the Union. Its 
ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov once claimed that: “Bulgaria is in a good position to become our 
special partner, a sort of a Trojan horse in the EU. 
Despite of fact, that Russia named Bulgaria as a possible ‚Trojan horse ‘, there are two other states 
which, actually, are the ‚Trojan horse ‘: Greece and Cyprus. These member states have ancient cultural and 
more recent geopolitical and economic roots. The support for Russia is founded because of the political 
help dealing with Turkey and, of course, supply of military equipment. And Russia, won‘t be Russia, if 
energy sector won‘t be included. European diplomats from other member states argue that, in exchange, 
Greece has sought to position itself as a ‘promoter’ of Russian positions within the EU on issues ranging 
from EU involvement in the Eastern neighborhood to the regulation of energy markets.33 
Greece has a very important relationship with Russia which are keeping them favorable for Russia. 
Athens is participating in the construction of the first ever Russia-controlled oil pipeline in the EU: Burgas-
Alexandroupolis which aims as reducing Greece’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil.34  Following up the 
several past years information, the Greece still stay in the light of interest as a ‚Trojan horse‘. Greece 
members of the European Parliament voted against the Association Agreement with Ukraine in the autumn 
of 2014, which was supported by the majority of the Strasbourg chamber. They also abstained in the vote 
on Association Agreements for Georgia and Moldova. Furthermore, Greece do not agreee with the 
sanctions imposing for Russia in 2014. The Greek ambassador refused to agree to the key passage on 
sanctions – prolonging the blacklisting of 132 individuals and 28 “entities”, mainly in eastern Ukraine and 
Crimea. Cyprus is one more ‚Trojan horse ‘in the line after Greece. Cyprus generally follows the Greek 
approach to Russia. Cyprus generally follows the Greek approach to Russia, in part because of the 
                                                          
32 ECFR interview, Brussels, 1 June 2007. 
33 ECFR interviews with EU and EU member states officials in Brussels on 1 June 2007, 16 July 2007 and 
5 October 2007. 
34 ‘Russia agrees to speed up Balkan oil pipeline project’, International Herald Tribune, 2006. 
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protection that Moscow has offered it in international bodies such as the United Nations. Russia has been 
a firm supporter of the Cypriot position in the conflict over North Cyprus - support which even extended 
to vetoing a UN resolution condemning the Republic of Cyprus for its rejection of the Annan peace plan in 
2004.35 This favorable relations with Russia guaranteed that Cyprus has become the most important haven 
for Russian capital in the EU. In 2006, Cyprus was formally the biggest investor in Russia - providing 
almost a fifth of total foreign investments in Russia ($9.8 billion). (Leonard & Popescu 2007) Together, 
Greece and Cyprus often take the lead defending Russia ‘s position on issues such as energy or the Eastern 
neighborhood. There is no single formula for how Russia projects power in Europe, but the goal of its 
Trojan horse strategy is the same: to build a web of political leaders, parties and civil society organizations 
that will legitimize Russia’s aims to destabilize European unity and undermine European values. 
Partners for cooperation. Russia seeks to cooperate with only the biggest and most influence having 
member states in the EU. These countries, - Germany, France, Italy and Spain, - are classified as a ‚general 
partners ‘. All countries have strong political and economic bilateral relationships with Russia from the old 
times. In Putin‘s rule these relations are respected in a principle „one great power owes another “.  
For a several decades, France has wanted to strengthen its own position in international relations. And 
Russia became a useful ally for French because of nuclear power and permanent member of the UN Security 
Council.  
Germany, also as France, has deep economic relationship with Russia. This is the reason why a 
political dialogue must be organized in a friendly way. Germany was Russia‘s biggest trading partner before 
the First World War, throughout the inter-war period, and once again after the Cold War. Even during the 
Cold War, the situation stayed the same. This shows that these economic relations have a long history after. 
(Spaulding,1991). In 2005, Germany’s trade with Russia amounted to an impressive €38.9 billion. Russia 
also supplied almost 40% of German gas needs, making Germany Russia’s most important gas market. 
German energy companies are central to the German-Russia partnership.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 The Scotsman . (20014). ‘Russia Veto for Cyprus’. http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=778&id=453672004  
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Figure 7. Russia gas exports to Germany, 1999-2015 
 
And as we can see in the diagram above, this dependence on Russia gas become more and more 
important for Germany. In 2015, Gazprom pipeline gas exports to Europe rose by 8% in 2015, mostly 
because of falling natural gas production in the EU. What’s more important, that Russian gas exports to 
Germany rose to record levels as the chart below shows. Russia now accounts for more than half of 
Germany’s foreign fuel imports, according to Bloomberg.  
Italy is also very dependent form Russia. It is not such a big amount of the gas needed for Italy, but 
it also reach about 32%. But the energy field is not the only one keeping a good relationships. Italy, under 
Silvio Berlusconi (1994–1995, 2001–2006 and 2008–2011), strong economic relations were lubricated by 
an extremely warm personal relationship with Putin. It was much seen when Putin even extended to a public 
defense by the Italian Prime Minister of the conduct of the war in Chechnya. After S. Berlusconi, Romano 
Prodi has deepened trade and energy links.  
Only the Spain has a less strength relations with Russia. It is because Spain, differently, then three 
above mentioned states, do not have such strong politic and economic place in the EU. Spain is not so 
interested for Russia, because it is difficult to impose political pressure for this country. The dependence 
on Russia gas is less and this do not allow Putin threat Spain as other EU members. Moreover, Spain has 
different position about ownership of EU energy companies – it supports full ownership unbending to EU 
energy companies. Concluding, it is important to mentioned, that support from these biggest EU member 
states are the most important for any coherent EU policy on Russia. They have also been wary of greater 
EU engagement in Ukraine or Georgia for fear of irritating Russia. And, apart from Spain, they have 
blocked the European Commission’s plans for energy liberalization.  
Friendly Pragmatists. This group consisted from the biggest part of the EU members: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal. The follows 
the lead of the voice by the biggest members, such as Germany or France. The approach of ‚friendly 
pragmatism ‘do not ten to oppose actions which they fear might irritate Russia. They cooperation is prevail 
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of business interest over political goals. They find Russia as a partner, rather than enemy or opponent in 
the political affairs. They try to avoid any military tension and causes which could foster the military tension 
or threats from Russia’s side.  
Frosty Pragmatists. While keeping business interests high on the agenda, the governments of these 
countries have not refrained from criticizing Russia's human rights record and failings on democracy. 
New Cold Warriors have developed an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to 
use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia. These group of countries consist of the newest EU 
members states but only the Baltic States have the most suspicious looks towards Russia’s actions. That 
make sense because for a many years these countries were under Soviet Union regime which leader was 
Russia. Since then the Baltic States is always ready to defend them selves and feels very insecure especially   
in the decisions which could fisicaly had an impact for them. 
As Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu (2007) represented in their publication -the five groups of the 
EU must to unite around a common approach especially when such important cases as international 
decisions are in the top priority and this one that reflects the EU's long-term strategic interests. The common 
situation of miscooperation is currently in Russia's favour. Regarding this situation, the authors recommend 
six possible solution which would be able to get rid from the situation in which the EU is stuck for a while: 
 Pushes for the implementation of all international agreements and standards Russia has 
committed itself to, in order to further promote the rule of law; 
 Makes Russia's participation in G8 summits conditional on its commitment to the spirit and 
the letter of common agreements, with the threat of organizing more low-level meetings within the 
G7 format should Russia be uncooperative; 
 Introduces the policy of 'principled bilateralism' where EU governments are expected to use 
bilateral links to serve common EU goals and introduce an early warning system to inform of 
impending energy deals or bilateral disputes; 
 Makes the EU Neighbourhood Policy more efficient to encourage participating countries to 
respect the rule of law and draw them further into the EU's orbit; 
 Gives the European Commission political backing to use competition policy to investigate 
energy deals; and authorise it to pre-approve major energy deals; 
 Provides assistance to Turkey, Ukraine and Moldova in implementing the EU's energy acquis 
communautaire. (Leonard, Popescu, 2007). 
 
We can conclude, that five before mentioned groups are looking towards two possible solutions 
dealing with Russia. One way is Russia‘s integration into the EU. They want involve Russia in as many 
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institutions as possible and encouraging Russian investments in the EU‘s energy sector. Sometimes, they 
are even ready to ignore that Russia breaks the rules, which are obligatory for other member states. Other 
part of the member states see and treat Russia as a threat. They believe, that Russian expansionism and 
contempt for democracy must be rolled back through a policy of ‚soft containment ‘and excluding Russian 
investment from the European energy sector. If the EU will follow one of these possibilities, two very 
different scenarios are possible. Following the first one, Russia will gain all the benefits of co-operation 
with the EU, but she will be able to not obey by stable rules apply for usual member state. Second one, the 
way which could be very risky for the EU, because than it would be hard for the EU to draw on Russia‘s 
helps to tackle a host of common problems in the European neighborhood and beyond. If the EU wants to 
have Russia as a law-abiding, reliable, and eventually democratic neighbor on a continent where even the 
last shadows of the Iron Curtain have dispelled, it must build its partnership with Russia on the same 
foundations that made European integration a success – interdependence based on stable rules, 
transparency, symmetrical relations and consensus. These foundations will not build themselves. The Union 
must be much more determined about agreeing rules of engagement with Russia, and then defending them. 
For Russia, it is natural to deal with individual EU member states. It is the way how Russia sees 
international politics. There is no better way than dealing tete-a-tete with great powers. It allows to seduce 
the political and economic leaders of big member states. Konstantin Kosachev, the chair of the Duma‘s 
international relations committee, represented the new perspective of Russia‘s point of view towards the 
EU: „We are sick and tired of dealing with Brussels bureaucrats, In Germany, Italy, France, we can achieve 
much more. The EY is not an institution that contributes to our relationship, but an institution that slows 
down progress. “36 Dealing with the EU Russia applies different policies which caused an economic cause. 
Many diplomatic pressure, trade embargoes, transport blockades and early renegotiation of gas or oil supply 
contracts. And this is happening of the political reasons seeking to have a stronger political influence in 
each country. 
The EU‘s foreign policy instruments are limited to „soft power “. This is the main reason why the EU 
‘s reaction to Russia ‘s annexation of Crimea and its subsequent military intervention in Eastern Ukraine 
consisted primarily of the imposition of economic sanctions. Sanctions are one of the EU's tools to promote 
the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): peace, democracy and the respect for 
the rule of law, human rights and international law.37 The EU and US has imposed different types of 
sanctions regimes in connection with Russia‘s aggression against Ukraine). The current sanctions placed 
on Russia and on certain local actors from Crimea and Ukraine’s Donbas region were initiated by 
                                                          
36 ECFR interview in Moscow (2007) 
37 Eurpean Union External Action. (2016). Sanctions Policy. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/423/sanctions-
policy_en 
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Transatlantic partners, the US and the EU, and are supported by a host of countries including Albania, 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Switzerland and 
Ukraine. In a brief view these regimes target several aspects which we are going to classified in this chapter. 
Russia invasion in Ukraine were too much for the EU. According the existing agreements in the EU 
these actions are strictly restricted. Any harmful actions can be allowed in the territory of other state. As a 
response the EU started meeting section on sanctions appliance for Russia which list is still growing ( 
Annex 1). Especially if these actions pose a threat for state sovereignty. Furthermore, these actions requires 
the highest reactions and imposed limitations. This is the reaction which the EU showed after the Russia 
invasion in Crimea on 18 Mach 2014. As Francesco Giumelli explains in EUISS Chaillot Paper 129/2013, 
international sanctions may pursue three sets of goals: signal to foreign target countries or domestic 
audiences’ dissatisfaction with certain policies; constrain the target countries or their leaders from 
undertaking future actions; or coerce a government into changing or reversing existing policies. Three 
different types of sanctions were imposed step by step for Russia: 
- Individuals and legal entities that have been involved in actions undermining or threatening 
the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine may be listed and have their assets 
in the EU area frozen.  
- Restrictions and later a total ban on the import into the EU of goods originating in Crimea or 
Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.  
- Economic sanctions against Russia restricting the use of EU financial markets, and prohibiting 
the export of armaments and dual-use goods and of equipment and services to the oil industry. 
(Biersteker & Portela 2015) 
The first sanctions regimes were imposed on 18 March 2014. They were meant to target the 
individuals and legal entities that have been involved in actions undermining or threatening the territorial 
integrity. Sovereignty and interdependence of Ukraine. Not only assets in the EU countries were frozen, 
but also the individuals were restricted from travel into the EU zone. Later, these sanctions were extended. 
These sanctions involved even Russia decision makers, persons or companies who have any sorts of deals 
with the separatists in eastern side of Ukraine. This list included 132 individuals from Russian and 
Ukrainian in all and 29 legal entities. (Bond, Odendahl & Rankin 2015). 
Later in the same year, 23 of June, the EU adopted the next step of regulations. The regulations were 
against the import of goods form Crimea and Sevastopol. The technical and financial assistance and 
insurance connected with such imports were also mentioned. Restrictions implemented that equipment and 
technology for transport, telecommunications and energy should not be exported to Crimea and Sevastopol.  
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After the tragic catastrophe of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17, the EU finally decided to extend 
sanctions on Russia and on separatist-controlled area. The final sanctions were economic sanctions which 
restricted the opportunity of Russian state-owned banks to seek financing on European capital markets and 
trade with certain sectors. The prohibitions for investments or trading in Russian state securities were 
applied. Targets for these prohibitions became five state-owned Russian banks – Sberbank, VTB, VEB, 
Vneshekonombank, and Rosselkhozbank – and financial institutions with their subsidiaries. The embargo 
on the export and import of arms from Russia and connected services were imposed as an addition for 
regulation. These sanctions were reinforced and broadened on 8 September because then was the end of 90 
days limitations which were applied in 23 June. The regulation duration was extended for more 30 days 
and included also three state-owned defense companies – Oboronprom, United Aircraft Corporation and 
Uralvagonzavod – and three state energy companies – Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazpromneft. According 
this extend no new loans can be given to the companies listed. Unfortunately, the trade credits were allowed. 
The last extension were imposed for the restrictions on the export of dual-use goods38 to the Russian military 
sector. Nine more companies were included. The extensions firstly were originally due till 15 July 2015, 
but on 15 March 2015 the European Council discussed the situation in Ukraine and it was agreed “that the 
duration of the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, adopted on 31 July 2014 and enhanced 
on 8 September 2014, should be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements, 
bearing in mind that this is only foreseen by 31 December 2015”. On 22 June 2015 the European Council 
decided to prolong all sanctions until 31 January 2016.  
In accordance for the EU, US also implemented sanctions for Russia (Annex 2). The US applies 
sanctions according three presidential executive orders. The first, Executive Order 13360, was signed by 
President Barack Obama on 6 March 2014. The two following executive orders, 13362 and 13362, were 
approved on 17 and 20 March 2014. The main aims of the US sanctions are to increase Russia’s political 
isolation as well as the economic costs to Russia. The special attention is dedicated for the areas which are 
the most important for President Putin and those close to him (Nelson 2015). The US imposed sanctions 
includes the following: 
- Asset freezes for specific individuals. Assets of individuals close to Vladimir Putin have been 
frozen. US individuals and entities are prohibited from conducting financial transactions with them. 
- Asset freezes for specific entities, particularly state-owned banks, and energy, companies and 
arms producers. 
- Restrictions on financial transactions with Russian firms in finance energy and defense. 
                                                          
38 Goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications and/or can contribute to the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-
use-controls/  
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- Restrictions on exports of oil-related technology. 
- Restrictions on exports of dual-use technology. (Nelson 2015) 
One month later, 28 April, the US was attempt to take further actions. The sanctions to Russia were 
expanded. This time the US extended its export restrictions on technologies and services regulated under 
the US Munitions List. But these expanded sanctions was not the last ones. On 16 July 2015 US Treasury39 
imposed several new economic sanctions. As in the EU sanctions, the US also included the same two 
financial institutions, Gazprombank and VEB, also two Russian energy firms, Novatek and Rosneft. The 
access to US capital markets was limited for them. In the same month, list of sanctioned financial 
institutions was extended one more time with adding three more banks. Furthermore, the arm firms were 
thrown in to the lite of sun. Eight arm firms were designated and these entities were frozen and transactions 
involving these companies were generally prohibited. One more extension was approved on 29 July.  
Going back in 2014, one more extension for sanction regime was taken. On 9 December the economic 
sanctions were extended and Russia’s largest bank – Sberbank – was included in the list of sanctions. 
Transactions for US individuals or entities was reduced from 90 to 30 days for all the six listed banks. 
Banks were not only ones touched by extensions once again, five more defense technology firms were 
blocked by the Treasury. 
Russia has an exclusive relations with the EU. These relations meet a lot of challenges which most 
of them are political issues. Unfortunately, the political issues has a huge effect on economic situation. 
Analyses of the statistical data is very helpful trying to understand the mean of political events for states 
economy. Best time interval for watching Russia’s dependency of political issues is the past ten years. This 
period is chosed because of possibility to compare  
In the summary, we can conclude that sanctions against Russia was taken by the political reasons. 
Because the main goal of the economic sanctions is imposed by sender in order to impose costs on the 
target with the aim of changing its political behavior with regard to the relevant conflict issue. The sanctions 
in combination with diplomatic efforts are the non-military responses to the Russian military aggression in 
Ukraine. Both, the US and the EU, hasn’t so far seen a military response as an option dealing with Russian 
actions in Crimea and Sevastopol. The alliance within the US and the EU tried carefully design and target 
the sanctions in a regard to have as much impact as possible on the regime and minimize the impact on the 
population.  
                                                          
39 The U.S. Treasury, created in 1789, is the government department responsible for issuing all Treasury bonds, notes and 
bills. Key functions of the U.S. Treasury include printing bills, postage and Federal Reserve notes, minting coins, collecting 
taxes, enforcing tax laws, managing all government accounts and debt issues, and overseeing U.S. banks in cooperation with the 
Federal  
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In Russia case it is difficult to analyses of how the sanctions are hitting the Russian economy. The 
reason why it is difficult concern the sanctions interactions with other factors and the difficulty to isolate 
the sanctions from these. But according the World Bank information there are three channels which have 
hit the Russia economy. First one talks about sanctions caused volatility on the foreign exchange market 
and a significant depreciation of rouble (ibid.). Second way is the restriction on access to international 
financial markets. These restrictions has tightened domestic and external credit conditions and this created 
a negative effect on investment and consumption. This effect have impacted the economy the most. And 
why is that? The main reason is that the biggest six banks were included in the “black” list and they affect 
the whole economy. The third channel mentioned by the World Bank is the crisis of confidence. The 
geopolitical tension and sanctions from the largest world entities have developed this consequence. It has 
caused great uncertainty regarding policy and economic development. But there we must noticed that 
despite of economical fall, authoritarian regimes are less sensitive to sanctions than democracies. Despite 
of fact, that economic growth has slowed downed the head of country has some additional powers to protect 
loyal elites. The authoritarian regimes have relatively more control over resources and rents which allows 
them to save loyal elites from economic hardship and distribute resources as they decide in order to stay in 
power. For brief example, Russia has its Putin’s rent management system. This system fulfils this function. 
Moreover, politically authoritarian regimes are not answerable to the state population for their actions. They 
can manipulate with public opinion by using the media and the internet. By the help of media they 
successfully suppress and eliminate any opposition. Even the events in Ukraine were perfectly disguised 
with Russians propaganda machine. In the Russian narrative the sanctions are interpreted as a strategy 
seeking to weaken Russia. The propaganda announces that the main goal of the US and the EU would be 
to bring about regime change in Moscow and “the American and European sanctions originate from an 
aggressive, illegitimate and counterproductive policy where Russia finds itself in a purely defensive 
position” (Fischer, 2015).  
The propaganda is a political tool forming the audience opinion in the country. As it is known from 
the very old times, Russian propaganda is always under Putin foot. This case is not an exception.  This tool 
effectively disseminate disinformation about the conflict in Ukraine both at home and abroad, as well as 
giving its own version about the “real” nature of sanctions. According this mass-media “America wants to 
see regime change in Russia and has manipulated its European allies to take part in this scheme”. 
Perceptions in Russia are manipulated and the Russian population do not understand the real aims behind 
the sanctions: The West wants Russia to leave Ukraine and respect it as a sovereign state. The authoritarian 
Russian regime is thus a factor that on the one hand supports the sanctions by leading to slower growth due 
to the suboptimal resource allocation favoring the rent-dependent sector, but on the other counteracts the 
sanctions by protecting loyal elites and unopposed blaming the West for all economic hardship and Russia’s 
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isolation. The regime has shown strong state capacity in controlling public opinion, thus manipulating the 
perceptions of the population and creating inimical feelings towards the US and the EU. 
Figure 8. Russian imports and exports of goods, January 2008-October 2016 ($ mil) 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com: Central Bank of Russia 
Together with other factors the economic sanctions applied for Russia have impacted its health being 
negatively. There are no doubts, that sanctions imposed against Russia is causing the crisis in the country. 
This crisis has effect on the Russian economy, both consumers and companies, and regional financial 
markets, as well as Putin's ambitions regarding the Eurasian Economic Union which he was planning so 
carefully. The geopolitical tension from the surrounding countries, threats of sanctions and imposing of 
them have originated a crisis of confidence that has damaged the eagerness of domestic and foreign actors 
to embark on business ventures in Russia and to invest. As it is available to see above, the Russia imports 
has fall down in the same level as it was at the time of World Economic Crisis. 
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Figure 9. Russia inflation rate, January 2008-October 2016 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com: Central Bank of Russia 
The ruthless financial sanctions have targeted Russia’s main state banks and key companies. These 
banks and companies has contributed to a stained financial situation in the whole economy and led to 
difficulties in refinancing debt in the short run and in financing investments. Such measures as monetary 
inflation reach double number in 2015 which showed very bad situation in Russia’s economy. By the 
beginning of 2016 the situation was more stabilized and the inflation rate increased.   
In a short word, the effect made by sanctions affects Russia’s economic development in the medium 
and long run. The situation is more compounded by the EU and US export bans on specific products that 
are crucial for the energy and defense sectors. The bans will affect technological development in both these 
areas. The current economic crisis in Russia has possible three main causes: the worsening structural 
problems of the Russian economy; serious tensions in the relations between Russia and the West, which 
have led to the “sanctions war”; the dramatic slump in oil prices.  
Figure 10. Russia Federation GDP rates, 1990-2016 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com: Central Bank of Russia 
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The reality was that Russia always get the easy money and do not have to invest in other sectors. And 
now, when state is facing the challenges of imposed sanctions, the leaders have to develop other industry 
sector. In broad perspective, since the beginning of Russia’s Federation the GDP was growing very slowly 
until 2003. Since 2003 it started to grow so much faster unfortunately the economic crisis hit Russia’s 
economy. But this fall of GDP was not such huge as it is seen right now as a result of applied sanctions. 
After the economic crisis Russia reach an amazing rise of economy. The situation was getting better ant 
better. But Puttin political decisions triped it. Hard power was used to create a pressure for Ukraine and 
that was one bad decision which get in Russia to the situation of 2008. While the US is keep growing and 
gaining even better economic situation years by years.  
Figure 11. United States GDP rates, 1990-2016 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com: Central Bank of Russia 
The industry sector is not an only problem showing that Russia has an inventible long time effect of 
sanctions. In the beginning of 2015, Russia had inflation level which reached two-digit levels for the first 
time since the Economic Crisis in 2008. Even the interventions in the market failed to improve the stability 
of the Russian currency. Now we have the end of year 2016 and the inflation situation is getting better. But 
for the past two year Russia have met the economic insecurity. The economic stagnation has caged Russia 
in its hands. Considering the main reason of this stagnation we can conclude only two main reasons – wrong 
political decisions made by Russian leaders. As result Russia nor only has stuck and even get back in the 
2008 crisis, but also get a politically motivated loss of trust by the perspective of West world. The indirect 
effect of sanctions is more difficult to estimate, but the tendency of European and US actors to withdraw 
end masse from financial and investment co-operation with Russian companies, often “just in case”, may 
have some long-term consequences. One more important measures showing that Russia has a major effect 
of sanctions is oil price. In 2014, it has slumped by more than 50%. That was a very painful for Russia 
economy, because it has directly influence for the budget stability. If oil prices decrease by 1 dollar, 
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Russia’s budget revenue decreases by around US$ 2 billion, but at the same time if the dollar appreciates 
by 1 trouble, Russia gains RUB 210 billion in additional budget revenue. Even though this dynamic 
produced a positive outcome in 2014, and Russia closed the year with a budget surplus40. 
Even the sanctions are a political tool reaching to change the politic situation in Russia by economic 
means, unfortunately, the political effect of the sanctions are less clear than the economic. In fact, this is 
because economic factors act in favors of sanctions succeeding. The EU and the US have a concerned view 
towards Russia political situation because of its insecure, so called, democratic actions, propaganda and 
threats. Unfortunately, all these means work as favor for Russia in this difficult crisis time. The political 
factors act on a contrary then economic factors because of the main previously discussed points. We can 
start with the authoritarian political system, used in Russia. This makes the regime less sensitive to the 
sanctions.  Previously in this chapter mentioned Putin’s rent management system let to protect loyal elite, 
the media and internet can control opinion because of its subordination for authority. Propaganda is working 
very effectively and let people believe in anything what’s Putin needs. The result of propaganda leaves no 
space for doubts. The idea that the West wants to hurt Russia for no particular reason and the effect has 
been spread that the West wants to see regime change in Russia are welcomed by the citizens of Russia. 
And it helps magically hide the real political behavior toward Ukraine which is the real goal of the West. 
One of the biggest surplus for Russia in its situation is that both parties have loss in this sanctioned period. 
The last, most non-sedative factor is that Russia has found the “Achilles heel” of the EU. Russia has tried 
many times to split the EU countries by using different embargoes regimes, threats and incentives. That 
shows the weakest part of the EU which is working in favor for Russia. The problem of the EU is that 
common union actually is not so common. The best examples can be tracked after the application of 
sanctions. Furthermore, the sanctions were firstly applied by the EU itself, but the EU member states are 
those who are breaking the rules. May 2016, France has defied an EU travel ban and granted a visa to 
Russian Agriculture Minister Alexander Tkachev, despite the fact he is blacklisted from entering the bloc due to 
his support of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. France has defied an EU travel ban and granted a visa to 
Russian Agriculture Minister Alexander Tkachev, despite the fact he is blacklisted from entering the bloc 
due to his support of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea.41  
 
 
                                                          
40 OSW Report. (2015). The Economic and Financial Crisis in Russia: background, symptoms and prospects for the future. 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/raport_crisis_in_russia_net.pdf 
41 Chadwuck V. (2016). France ignores EU sanctions list, grants visa to banned Russian minister. Politico. 
http://www.politico.eu/article/france-ignores-sanctions-russian-minister-news-via-alexander-tkachev-crimea/  
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3. GENERALIZATION OF EU POLITICAL RELATIONS DYNAMICS WITH 
US AND RUSSIA 
 
Politics and Economics approach international trade from completely different points of view using 
completely different analytical frameworks. The problem is that states think in terms of geography and 
population, which are the relatively stable factors that define its domain while markets are defined by 
exchange and the extent of the forward and backward linkages that derive therefrom. The borders of markets 
are dynamic, transparent, and porous; they rarely coincide 4 exactly with the borders of states and a few 
markets today are even global in their reach. When trade within a market involves buyers and sellers in 
different nation-states, it becomes international trade and the object of political scrutiny. The political 
analysis of this subject treats international trade as fundamentally different from domestic economic activity 
The international exchange of goods, services, or resources with another country raises many political 
questions of national interest, especially questions concerning the economic and military security of the 
nation. 
When states are using soft power and keep more liberal position it is more easier to create a dialogue 
between states because in such cases they look forward with more respect for each other. It allows    
Trade embargoes are another economic tool of foreign policy and a great deal of IPE research has 
focused upon the political economy of trade policies. The multilateral economic embargo on South Africa, 
for example, linked that nation's policy of racial apartheid with international trade. The logic of an embargo 
is to shut off imports of many vital items and reduce export earning, thereby reducing domestic welfare and 
providing the state with an incentive to change its 5 policies. The South Africa embargo was relatively 
successful in this respect, although ending the embargo was obviously not the only reason why that 
government ended apartheid. The U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, on the other hand, has been ineffective 
is bringing down the Castro government. The conditions for the effective use of trade and trade embargoes 
in foreign policy is a productive area of IPE research. Much of the work on the IPE of international trade 
has been, as seen above, an attempt to bring economic factors into the study of International Relations by 
taking economic security concerns and economic foreign policy tools into consideration. This process has 
also produced a counter flow -- bringing political factors into the analysis of International economics. 
Adding politics to economics is not a straightforward process. The conventional economic analysis of 
international trade is based upon the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor proportions theory, which provides 
a neoclassical analytical framework for the study of comparative advantage. This theory is essentially 
stateless and therefore apolitical. What the factor proportions theory has to say about trade between two 
nations is not fundamentally different from the analysis of trade between two regions (Northern England 
and Southern England, for example), or trade between two cities or tribes. What should the state's policy 
be towards international trade? Interestingly, this is the one question on which economists agree. Except in 
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certain special cases, free trade results in an efficient allocation of resources and therefore maximizes the 
value of those resources globally. Basically free trade eliminates the waste that occurs when goods and 
services are produced inefficiently. The key to this economic analysis is that it is unconcerned with where 
production takes place (at home or abroad) and only concerned with maximizing the value of the resources 
used in production and minimizing the waste of inefficient local production. In short, the economic theory 
of comparative advantage does not care where the wheat in your bread was grown, or who baked the loaf, 
but only that the production of the bread is not inefficient or wasteful. Nation-states define themselves by 
population and geography. States, therefore, do care about the where and who and this creates a tension 
between the economic and the political analysis of trade. 
These relations between the politics and economics are inseparable. And the correlation between both 
sides are required in many spheres thinking about the healthiness of the state and even the situation of IR. 
The chapter below have determined the two different types of IR. The first one can be compared as an ideal 
type of IR and IPE when both sides have the same values, ideas, goals and vilingnes to reach a higher level 
of cooperation. This type of relations is suitable for the EU-US relations. Regarding the political actions 
applied in IPE both of them can be PRISKIRTOS for the Economic Liberalists. Economic Liberalists are 
cooperative, try to find the best way to foster new agreement but in the same moment they play as an 
individual actors, equal partners in the world and keeps the social values in the first position when dealing 
with one another. Through a long history of cooperation the EU and US always kept the relation in the 
warm way. First of all, the economic position stability leading the Global Market of the US is always 
attractive for the EU which seeks to be such important in the World. For a many years, the US saved its 
position and even in the economic crisis time in 2008, the US stayed still leading state. As it is seen in the 
chart below, very different situation is with other important partner for the EU. Russia, unfortunately, has 
a very difficult situation regarding the economic stability and especially when we are talking about the 
political relations specific. Since the creation of Russia Federation the specific of IR has not changed until 
nowadays. Mercantelism is dominating IPE theory in Russia. State power is main source for international 
goals. Differently than US, Russia ignores the idea about same values. It is the weakening pool for the state 
and the EU is the biggest mistake which individual states can choose. So many independent countries can 
not to seek the same goal in all the spheres. In the result some of them must ignore their own wishes and 
must accept the majority. For Russia, such type of relations is not suitable. In contrary, it is more important 
to stay military strong and independent state. The only one way to be leading country in the World is to rise 
the goals which corresponds only for one, individual states, wishes and reach then in any cost. Furthermore, 
the regime “divide and conquer” is still dominating in Russia’s perspective. Despite of globalization and 
modernization process in the World, Russia stays at the same position as it was in 1990 and that has a huge 
cost.  
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Considering the fact that all high level meetings are arranged only by politics its natural, that the 
biggest attention is brought to the state interest rather that economical wealth. The most important fact is 
that even the economical agreements such as trades are still voted by politicians which not always take in 
to account an economic effect of agreements. Unfortunately, the economic specialists have no rights even 
participate in such high level meetings which causes some misunderstandings in decision making process.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. A theory of IR is a set of ideas that explains how the international system works. The research 
project focused mainly on IPE theory and what position states choose for their cooperation. State 
interests often include such indicators as self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity, 
and influence over other states . Sometimes two or more states can have the same or different 
state interests which are the main idicators representing the IPE branch selected for state. During 
the clarifying process there were identified two main IPE theories which are used by selected 
states. The EU and US are using Economic Liberalism model which represents the main ideas 
such as cooperation, social interests and economic prosperity. Russia Federation take the oposit 
IPE theory – mercantalism which represent completely different values. State power, conflictual 
type of cooperation and politic decesive features are the main reflections in Russia‘s relations 
with other states. 
2. Determination of the political relations dynamics showed two different approaches of 
international cooperation. The EU-US trasnatlantic relations represents the stability and mutual 
understanding between both sides. While relations with Russia has a more dynamic view.  
3. Results of research project allows to conclude that political decisions has a merge effect on states 
economy which can be positive or negative. It depends on political relations model which states 
are using on IR. Positive effect on states economy shows a high level of cooperation and 
understanding between both trading partners. The EU-US relations belongs to this positive 
relations.  Russia‘s relations with the EU reflects completely different effect on states economy. 
Because of Russia‘s conflitual politic position it suffers a negative economic effect of political 
decision making process: 
 
 
Negative sanctions effect on Russia's economy
EU-US sanctions on Russia Federation
Aannexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
Inflation of national 
monetary 
GDP reduction 
Decrease of 
import/export 
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Aggresive political decisions caused a new flow of crisis in Russia. In a short word, the 
effect made by sanctions affects Russia’s economic development in the medium and long 
run. It allows to conclude that the type of political relations and taken decisions have an in 
sight effect on states economy while economic reasons can be used only as the means to 
reach some political changes.  
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1 ANNEX. Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine 
Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/ 
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2 ANNEX. US sanctions applied for Russia Federation in response to the crisis in Ukraine 
Source: http://www.stewartlaw.com/Article/ViewArticle/1078 
A.    OFAC Sanctions 
OFAC’s sanctions program currently consists of three different categories of sanctions: 
1. Traditional blocking sanctions against specific Ukraine- and Russia-related individuals and entities, 
which are listed on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”); 
2. Sectoral sanctions prohibiting certain types of transactions with specific entities operating in particular 
sectors of the Russian economy, which are listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List (“SSI 
List”); and 
3. Prohibitions on new investment and on the exportation or importation of goods, technology, or services 
to or from Crimea. 
1.     U.S. Blocking Sanctions (SDN List) 
The sanctioned individuals and entities include: 
 Crimean separatists and Russian supporters; 
 Crimea-based businesses; 
 Crimean seaports; 
 Former Ukrainian government officials; 
 Russian government officials and members of Russian President Putin’s inner circle; 
 Russian banks; 
 Russian defense and arms companies, such as Kalashnikov Concern and the Almaz-Antey Group; 
 Businesses and holding companies owned or controlled by sanctioned persons; and 
 Individuals and entities that have supported serious and sustained evasion of sanctions. 
2.     U.S. Sectoral Sanctions (SSI List) 
Financial Services Sector 
 
 Sberbank of Russia – the largest bank in Russia; 
 VTB Bank OAO – Russia’s second-largest banking group; 
 Gazprombank OAO – the third-largest bank in Russia and the financial arm of the world’s 
largest gas producer, Gazprom, which provides financial services to more than 45,000 companies 
and has 40 branches in Russia; 
 Vnesheconombank (VEB) – a Russian state-owned financial institution that acts as a 
development bank and payment agent for the Russian government; 
 Russian Agricultural Bank/Rosselkhozbank – a Russian state-owned financial institution that 
acts as a Russian government agent and has the second-largest regional branch network in the 
Russia; and 
 a number of subsidiaries of such banks. 
Energy Sector 
1. Rosneft – Russia’s largest petroleum company and third-largest gas producer; 
2. Gazprom Neft – the fourth-largest oil producer in Russia; 
3. Transneft – a Russian government-owned pipeline company; 
4. OAO Novatek – Russia’s largest independent natural gas producer; and 
5. a number of subsidiaries of Rosneft. 
6. Gazprom – a large government-owned energy company that engages in gas exploration, 
production, transportation, storage, processing and sales; 
7. Gazprom Neft; 
 71 
 
8. Lukoil – a Russia-based oil and gas company; 
9. Surgutneftegas – another Russian oil and gas company; and 
10. Rosneft and related companies. 
Defense Sector 
1. Rostec, a state-owned defense conglomerate, and its subsidiaries. 
3.     U.S. Trade Embargo and New Investment Ban Regarding Crimea 
Third, the United States has imposed comprehensive sanctions against the region of Crimea under Executive Order 
13685 of December 2014.  The following transactions involving Crimea are generally prohibited:   
 New investment in Crimea by U.S. individuals and companies and other entities (including 
foreign branches);  
 The importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services, or technology 
from Crimea; and   
 The exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or 
by U.S. individuals, companies, and other entities (including foreign branches), of any goods, 
services, or technology to Crimea. 
B.    BIS and DDTC Sanctions 
Unlike the OFAC sanctions, which regulate the conduct of persons, the BIS and DDTC restrictions apply to the 
export, reexport or foreign transfer of U.S.-origin items (including items in the possession of foreign persons outside 
of the United States).  The BIS and DDTC restrictions are summarized below. 
1.     Military and Defense-Related Restrictions 
 In late March 2014, the BIS and DDTC placed a hold on issuing licenses for exports and re-exports of 
controlled items, defense articles, and defense services to Russia until further notice.   
 In April 2014, the BIS and DDTC announced that they would deny pending applications for licenses and 
revoke existing licenses to export or reexport controlled “high technology” items to Russia or occupied 
Crimea that contribute to Russia’s military capabilities.  
 BIS subsequently imposed an export license requirement under 15 C.F.R. § 744.21 for exports, reexports, or 
transfers of listed items when the exporter knows or has been informed by BIS that the item is intended, 
entirely or in part, for a military end use or military end user in Russia.  BIS will deny licenses for exports, 
reexports, or transfers that it determines would make a material contribution to Russia’s military capabilities. 
2.     Energy Sector Restrictions 
Under 15 C.F.R. § 746.5, BIS requires a license for exports, reexports, or transfers of listed items when the 
exporter knows or has been informed by BIS that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or 
production of, oil or gas in Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore locations, or shale formations in Russia, or is unable 
to determine whether the item will be used in such projects.  A presumption of denial applies for exports, reexports, 
or transfer for projects that have the potential to produce oil.  BIS will review license applications for projects that 
have the potential to produce gas on a case-by-case basis. 
3.     Crimea 
Under 15 C.F.R. § 746.6, a license is generally required to export or reexport to Crimea or transfer within 
Crimea any item subject to the EAR, other than food and medicine designated as EAR99 and certain software 
necessary to enable exchange of personal communications over the Internet.  BIS will review license applications 
with a presumption of denial, except for items authorized under OFAC Ukraine-Related General License (GL) No. 
4 such as medical devices, medical supplies, and agricultural commodities, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis.  There are some limited exceptions to this license requirement. 
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4.     Entity List 
The BIS has added several Crimean and Russian entities to its Entity List.  These entities include, but are not limited 
to, Russian defense and energy companies.   The BIS’s Entity List designations overlap with, but do not match, 
OFAC’s designations. 
Typically, a license is required for the export, reexport or foreign transfer of any items subject to the EAR to entities 
designated on the Entity List, with a presumption of denial.  These restrictions apply to most of the Crimean and 
Russian entities on the Entity List.  However, BIS has designated five Russian energy companies on the Entity List 
that are subject to fewer restrictions than those applicable to most entities on the Entity List: 
 Gazprom; 
 Gazprom Neft; 
 Lukoil; 
 Surgutneftegas; and 
 Rosneft. 
For these five companies, a license is required for export, re-export or foreign transfer of items subject to the EAR 
when the exporter, reexporter or transferor knows those items will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, 
or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia.  License applications for such transactions 
will be reviewed with a presumption of denial when for use for projects in Russia with the potential to produce oil. 
 
 
